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Societies of Subjugation
Khaled Ali Beydoun*
Abstract
Foundational surveillance studies theory has largely been
shaped in line with the experiences of white subjects in western
capitalist societies. Formative scholars, most notably Michel
Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, theorized that the advancement of
surveillance technology tempers the State’s reliance on mass
discipline and corporal punishment. Legal scholarship
examining modern surveillance perpetuates this view, and
popular interventions, such as the blockbuster docudrama The
Social Dilemma and Shoshana Zuboff’s bestseller The Age of
Surveillance Capitalism, mainstream the myth of colorblind
surveillance. However, the experiences of nonwhite subjects of
surveillance—pushed to or beyond the margins of these formative
discourses—reflect otherwise.
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By disrupting surveillance theory and pushing it beyond the
white subject and the West, this Article introduces the “society of
subjugation” as a rebuttal. First, society of subjugation theory
demystifies the colorblind presumption that advancements in
surveillance technology humanize the State’s administration of
it by diminishing reliance on mass discipline and punishment.
Second, this unchecked deployment of digital surveillance in
authoritarian states is intended to subjugate minority groups
marked as oppositional, a form of collective discipline and
punishment that supersedes social control—as critical scholars
examining racialized surveillance in the United States have
argued. Through its focal case study of Uyghur surveillance in
China, this Article analyzes how state administration of digital
surveillance blurs the mandates of mass control, discipline, and
punishment into a state ensemble of subjugation.
Further, this Article builds on surveillance literature by
arguing that the salient locus of state surveillance may be racial
identity, but, depending on the political context, may fixate on
other forms of subaltern identity such as religion, sexual
orientation, gender, and their intersections. In turn, this expands
scholarly analysis and attention to other groups stigmatized by
the rising tide and deepening gaze of digital surveillance—a
phenomenon unfolding on a global scale.
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INTRODUCTION
Every breath you take,
Every move you make . . .
Every step you take,
I’ll be watching you.

The Police1

“I was arrested on 22 May 2017. The statement says that
I’m a terrorist.”2 Before her arrest, the state tracked every
terrestrial and virtual footstep Jelilova Gulbahar left behind.3
Every online purchase and social media exchange, every phone
conversation and checkpoint stop, supplied the state with a fluid
stream of data; data fed into a policing algorithm that led to
1. THE POLICE, EVERY BREATH YOU TAKE (A&M Records 1983).
2. Julia van den Muijsenberg, Uyghur Camp Survivor: ‘The Chinese
Guards Laughed, Checking Our Naked Bodies. We Couldn’t Even Cry’, INT’L
ANGLE (Jan. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/W4CP-MLQ5.
3. See Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using
A.I. to Profile a Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/C5LPVY5W (“[D]ocuments and interviews show that the authorities are also using
a vast, secret system of advanced facial recognition technology to track and
control the Uighurs, a largely Muslim minority.”).
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Jelilova’s identification as a “terrorist.”4 Like millions before her
and the millions more that will follow, “the yellow square around
her face on the screen indicated that she had . . . been deemed a
‘pre-criminal.’”5
Immediately after her arrest, Jelilova was taken to a
concentration camp.6 There, she learned that more than one
million people were detained inside of China’s network of 1,200
prison camps.7 The inner sanctums of these camps were theaters
of mass discipline and ghastly punishment, which, for Jelilova,
began with the removal of her hijab.8 Prison guards cackled as
they replaced the Islamic headdress with a freshly shaven
head.9 After that initial “dignity taking,” Jelilova was escorted
into a cell where she met other women arrested on terror
charges.10 The majority of them were Uyghur; all of them were
Muslims.11
Days in the prison blended together until they blurred into
one. “In the morning we had one minute each to use the
bathroom. If we used it longer, we got punished,” she shared.12
Following the bathroom drill, Jelilova and the other inmates
4. Muijsenberg, supra note 2. See DARREN BYLER, IN THE CAMPS: CHINA’S
HIGH-TECH PENAL COLONY (2021) [hereinafter IN THE CAMPS] for a trenchant
examination of the cutting-edge technologies the Chinese Government
currently employs to persecute the Uyghur and other ethnic Muslims in China.
5. IN THE CAMPS, supra note 4, at 11.
6. See id.
7. Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Panel Confronts China over Reports that
It Holds a Million Uighurs in Camps, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018),
https://perma.cc/V279-72AA. The number of Uyghur and ethnic Muslims
imprisoned in Chinese camps could be as high as two million. Lindsay
Maizland, China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELS., https://perma.cc/7BXC-FGSD (last updated Mar. 1, 2021, 7:00 AM)
(providing the number imprisoned); Sheena Chestnut Greitens et al.,
Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in
Xinjiang, 44 INT’L SEC., Winter 2019, at 9, 10 [hereinafter Counterterrorism
and Preventive Repression] (providing the number of concentration camps).
8. Muijsenberg, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. Id. See Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity
Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical Framework for Understanding
Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
796, 817 (2016), in which the author defines a “dignity taking” as the stripping
of humanity that accompanies the taking of property.
11. Muijsenberg, supra note 2.
12. Id.
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were forced to sing Communist Party jingles: “Long live the
Communist Party” and “I love China.”13 After weeks, the
Mandarin lyrics rolled from her tongue and muted the native
Uyghur she was restricted from speaking.14 These imposed
disciplines were designed to treat the “illness,” and
systematically “wash clean the [captives’] brains” of it.15 Their
ailment?16 The very ethnic and Muslim identity that defines who
Jelilova and fourteen million Uyghur in Xinjiang are and, in a
surveillance society designed to subjugate them, struggle to
remain.17
But the middle-aged Uyghur woman and the vast majority
of the prisoners were no terrorists. That word was stripped of its
meaning and deployed by the State to suppress a people long
cast as oppositional and subversive.18 The State deployed
counterterrorism law to intensify its crackdown on the
Uyghurbehind the curtains of the camps and the digital walls

13. Id.; see David Stavrou, A Million People Are Jailed at China’s Gulags.
I Managed to Escape. Here’s What Really Goes on Inside, HAARETZ (Oct. 18,
2019), https://perma.cc/BS5G-KCZ6.
14. Muijsenberg, supra note 2.
15. Adrien Zenz, “Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts”: Evidence from Chinese
Government Documents About the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s
Extrajudicial Internment Campaign, J. POL. RISK (Nov. 24, 2019),
https://perma.cc/2DJY-DAJ7.
16. Sigal Samuel, China Is Treating Islam Like a Mental Illness,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/YQT4-MZHB.
17. See Maya Wang, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses”: China’s
Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept.
9, 2018), https://perma.cc/C5L8-V3SG. Xinjiang is also referred to as “Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.” See Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
AMNESTY INT’L, https://perma.cc/9ZYF-X37E. For purposes of brevity, this
Article will refer to the disputed territory as Xinjiang. For a comprehensive
history of the territory, see JAMES A. MILLWARD, EURASIAN CROSSROADS: A
HISTORY OF XINJIANG (2007).
18. See Jean Seaton, Why Orwell’s 1984 Could Be About Now, BBC (May
7, 2018), https://perma.cc/88R9-A6S7 (“[T]he greatest horror in Orwell’s
dystopia is the systematic stripping of meaning out of language. The regime
aims to eradicate words and the ideas and feelings they embody.”).
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that surrounded Xinjiang.19 Eventually, Jelilova confessed to
the charge of terrorism.20
The global War on Terror legitimized that charge and
intensified the “Han” supremacist campaign to suppress and
stamp out the Uyghur.21 Supplemented by domestic
counterextremism laws and the regime’s “Strike Hard on
Terror” campaign, Xinjiang has been reengineered into a
postmodern Panopticon that tracks every breath and mines
every move of its Uyghur Muslim captives.22 The new policing
technologies that extend Beijing’s eyes into every facet of
Uyghur life are the building blocks of China’s new state of
surveillance, where the threat of incarceration looms alongside
a society characterized by total “e-carceration”23a society in
which predictive algorithms, tracking software, and facial
recognition cameras are planted throughout the province, and

19. See Khaled A. Beydoun, Exporting Islamophobia in the Global “War
on Terror”, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 81, 93–96 (2020) [hereinafter Exporting
Islamophobia], for an examination of how the American War on Terror
facilitated the Chinese regime’s crackdown on the Uyghur under the banner
of counterterrorism.
20. See Muijsenberg, supra note 2 (“For a day and a night, they
interrogated while I was locked in this chair. Then they forced me to sign a
false confession.”); see also GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 232 (1949) (“He became
simply a mouth that uttered, a hand that signed whatever was demanded of
him. His sole concern was to find out what they wanted him to confess, and
then confess to it quickly, before the bullying started anew.”).
21. See infra Part III.B.1. The Han are the largest ethnic group in China,
comprising roughly 91 percent of the population. See Who Is Chinese?: The
Upper Han, ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/22EN-8ABW.
22. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF A PRISON
205 (1975) (describing the Panopticon as a “cruel, ingenious cage”). A
“Panopticon” is form of prison designed to maintain continual surveillance of
the captives. JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON 60–64 (1791); see Ross Andersen,
The
Panopticon
Is
Already
Here,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
2020),
https://perma.cc/N3ZJ-ZYPX (examining President Xi Jinping’s use of A.I.
technology to police Xinjiang’s Uyghur). For an accessible account of the
establishment and expansion of the Chinese surveillance state across the
country, see KAI STRITTMATTER, WE HAVE BEEN HARMONIZED (2020).
23. Legal scholar Chaz Arnett defines “e-carceration” as “electronic
correctional surveillance, such as electronic ankle monitors” that “seeks to
encapsulate the outsourcing of aspects of prison into communities under the
guise of carceral humanism: the repackaging or rebranding of corrections and
correctional programming as caring and supportive, while still clinging to
punitive culture.” Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-Carceration, 41
CARDOZO L. REV. 641, 645 (2019) [hereinafter From Decarceration].
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rooted inside the devices that accompany the Uyghur wherever
they go.24
Far more than cogs of a novel “surveillance capitalism”
machine,25 these surveillance technologies form the prevailing
architecture
of
policing
in
Xinjiang—and
societies
beyondwhere modern policing is remaking new orders of
digital surveillance.26 These digital tools form the new
surveillance sites where punishment, discipline, and control
ominously blur into one.
***
On January 26, 2020, Netflix premiered The Social
Dilemma.27 The docudrama highlighted the dangers posed by
surveillance capitalism and, specifically, the Artificial
Intelligence (A.I.) technology that drives it.28 The film sounded
an alarm against the enveloping impact A.I. has on modern life
and, even more piercingly, its capacity to reshape human
behavior.29 Through A.I., “surveillance intermediaries” like
Google and Facebook have remade our smartphones into “one
way mirrors” that mine our data for capital ends.30 They then

24. China has an estimated 200 million surveillance cameras throughout
its territory, “four times as many as the United States.” Paul Mozur, Inside
China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (July
8, 2018), https://perma.cc/DP2J-T38H.
25. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE
CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER
(2019).
26. See Paul Triolo & Kevin Allison, The Digital Silk Road: Expanding
China’s Digital Footprint, EURASIA GRP. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/7C7XTCN3.
27. THE SOCIAL DILEMMA (Netflix 2020).
28. See Devika Girish, ‘The Social Dilemma’ Review: Unplug and Run,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/6V73-MZX8 (explaining that the
movie reveals how social media companies engage in “manipulation of human
behavior for profit”).
29. See id.
30. ZUBOFF, supra note 25, at 80–81. Legal scholar Alan Z. Rozenshtein
defines “surveillance intermediaries” as “companies like Apple, Google, and
Facebook that dominate digital communications and data storage and on
whose cooperation government surveillance relies.” Alan Z. Rozenshtein,
Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 99 (2018).
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(re)make us, with phones in hand wherever we go, into addicted
engines that drive the new surveillance capitalism economy.31
Digital surveillance is more threatening for over-policed
groups, like Black or Muslim communities, whose collected data
is frequently resold to government agencies for the purpose of
surveilling them.32 Further, police departments are adopting
these technologies to make law enforcement more “efficient,”
particularly in already-over-policed communities.33 The mining
technology driving “Big Data Policing” is predictive and being
rapidly mainstreamed into the policing strategies of law
enforcement departments in the United States, China, and
countries beyond and in-between.34
However, in China and other states trending toward
authoritarian-style policing, Big Data Policing is far more than
a novel frontier of surveillance with designs of deepening social
control. It is a system of subjugation wielded by the state to
deepen its authority and eliminate its opposition. The objective
is more sinister and supersedes the end of controlling
citizens—by eliminating subjects. This Article probes the
human costs associated with emerging surveillance technologies

31. See ZUBOFF, supra note 25, at 81 (describing Google’s enabling
practices that access behavioral data).
32. For example, the U.S. military purchased the data of 98 million
Muslim users of a popular prayer app for counterterror purposes. See Joseph
Cox, How the U.S. Military Buys Location Data from Ordinary Apps, VICE
NEWS (Nov. 16, 2020, 10:35 AM), https://perma.cc/A2UM-KZJM.
33. See Ngozi Okidegbe, The Democratizing Potential of Algorithms?, 53
CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), for a comprehensive analysis of how
algorithm-driven policing disproportionately harms poor communities of color
and excludes these communities from the enterprise of designing policing
algorithms. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing,
15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 503 (2018), for an analysis of how pre-trial algorithms
are used to assess the flight risk of defendants and are disproportionately
enforced against defendants of color, and Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing
Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017), for an examination of how
sentencing judges use algorithms to determine a defendant’s eligibility for a
non-prison sentence.
34. For a comprehensive account of “Big Data Policing,” which is the use
of modern technology to facilitate criminal policing, see ANDREW GUTHRIE
FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE
FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017) [hereinafter THE RISE OF BIG DATA]. See
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 327 (2015), for an analysis of how law enforcement departments
employ algorithms to forecast and assess criminality.
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that target subjects living beyond the shield of privacy and its
buffer of constitutional protection.35 Moreover, this Article asks:
what are the risks when the subject being mined of her data is
Jelilova in Xinjiang instead of Jennifer in Palo Alto? 36
By introducing a new theoretical framework for
understanding surveillance within “societies of subjugation,”
this Article grapples with these and other questions tied to race,
religion, identity, and emerging fronts of digital surveillance
designed to persecute subaltern groups.37 Further, theorizing
surveillance from the vantage point of non-white identity
challenges longstanding presumptions that render minority
experiences marginal or invisible and builds on legal
scholarship examining the impact of “Big Data” policing on
communities of color by thinking about its enforcement beyond
race.38
First, society of subjugation theory demystifies the
colorblind presumption that advancements in surveillance
technology humanize state administration by diminishing
reliance on mass discipline and punishment. Second, this
unchecked deployment of digital surveillance in authoritarian

35. For a critical assessment of modern surveillance in the United States,
see Henry A. Giroux, Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance
State, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/C9XA-AXA3. See generally
Jeffrey L. Vagle, Furtive Encryption: Power, Trust, and the Constitutional Cost
of Collective Surveillance, 90 IND. L.J. 101 (2015) (cautioning against the
constitutionality of post-9/11 mass surveillance).
36. See Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA.
L. REV. 109, 127 (2017) (“Data mining is the use of machine learning
techniques to find useful patterns and relationships in data. It works by
exposing a machine learning algorithm to examples of cases of interest with
known outcomes.”).
37.
“Societies of subjugation” are a type of surveillance society in which
the state wields sophisticated technology to form a digital surveillance
architecture designed to persecute, and then stamp out, an oppositional group.
Societies of subjugation are distinct from what French philosopher Gilles
Deleuze dubs “societies of control” in which corporations like Google and
Facebook are the principal makers of surveillance and social control. Gilles
Deleuze, Postscript on the Societies of Control, 59 OCTOBER 3, 5–6 (1992).
38. For a definition of “Big Data,” see Kurt Iveson & Sophia Maalsen,
Social Control in the Networked City: Datafied Dividuals, Disciplined
Individuals and Powers of Assembly, 37 SOC’Y & SPACE 331, 332–33 (2018),
which defines it as “data that are being produced at scales and rates previously
unseen and which can only be analyzed algorithmically and underpinned by a
rationale of increased efficiency and cost-effectiveness.”
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states is intended to subjugate minority groups marked as
oppositional, a form of collective discipline and punishment that
supersedes social control—as critical scholars examining
racialized surveillance in the United States have argued.39
Through its focal case study of Uyghur surveillance in China
and of China’s expanding digital footprint beyond Xinjiang, this
Article analyzes how state enforcement of digital surveillance
blurs the mandates of mass control, discipline, and violence into
a state ensemble of subjugation.
Beyond race and racism, the disciplinary and punitive
effects of digital surveillance are determined by the character of
the state and the policies it enacts against targeted groups to
justify that surveillance. By theorizing beyond the prism of
whiteness and the West, this Article builds on surveillance
literature by arguing that the salient locus of state surveillance
may fixate on race and racism, but, depending on context, turns
to other “subaltern identities” including religion, sexual
orientation, gender, political affiliation, social group, and their
intersections.40

39. Simone Browne describes racialized surveillance as “a technology of
social control where surveillance practices, policies, and performances concern
the production of norms pertaining to race and exercise a power to define what
is in our out of place.” SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE
OF BLACKNESS 16 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). Racialized surveillance
“reif[ies] boundaries, borders, and bodies along racial lines,” often producing
unequal and discriminatory outcomes. Id. For instance, Chaz Arnett, who is
widely cited in this Article, observes that “[s]urveillance must be understood
as a powerful tool of control” when considering racialized surveillance against
communities in the United States, using Baltimore, Maryland as a case study.
Chaz Arnett, Race, Surveillance, Resistance, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103, 1142 (2020)
[hereinafter Race, Surveillance, Resistance]. This Article and the subjugation
society frame demonstrate how state surveillance against minority groups in
authoritarian states aims to impose harms that supersede the threshold of
social control.
40. This Article defines “subaltern” as communities or groups
subordinated along identity lines not only by race, but also by religion, class,
sexual orientation, and more. In line with this Article’s focus on identity
beyond race and racism, “subaltern” is a useful term encompassing the
germane myriad of subordinated identity markers. See Kimberlé Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1298 (1991) (describing the “myriad
ways” that individuals within certain identities “have been systematically
subordinated”).
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Legal scholars have highlighted the centrality of context in
determining the scale of surveillance deployed by state actors.41
This Article broadens this frame beyond race, racism, and the
West to reveal how the scale of surveillance is intensified in
authoritarian contexts in which the legal constraints are thin or
entirely nonexistent. In addition, by examining the subjugation
society in relation to a population underexamined by legal
scholars, this Article builds on the Author’s formative work on
Islamophobia by introducing the emerging tentacle of “digital
Islamophobia”—deployed variably against Muslim communities
in the United States and, with the War on Terror protracting
into a third decade and into new countries, Muslim populations
all over the world.42
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I analyzes
formative surveillance theory and its attendant surveillance
society typology. It then examines the rebuttals of critical
scholars, most notably Simone Browne and critical race tech
scholars, who interrogate how colorblind surveillance theory
overlooks the distinct surveillance experiences of Black subjects.
Part II introduces the society of subjugation and its
attendant theoretical framework as a rebuttal building on
colorblind and racialized surveillance theory. It then theorizes
how digital surveillance in a subjugation society capitalizes on
the ensemble of punishment, discipline, and control to achieve
its political objective of subjugation—a condition of collective

41. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Technologically Distorted Conceptions of
Punishment, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 483, 507 (2019), for an examination of how
risk assessment tools were spawned and then enforced on communities marred
by structural racism, poverty, and over-policing.
42. See KHALED A. BEYDOUN, AMERICAN ISLAMOPHOBIA: UNDERSTANDING
THE ROOTS AND RISE OF FEAR 28 (2018) (defining Islamophobia “as the
presumption that Islam is inherently violent, alien, and unassimilable, a
presumption driven by the belief that expressions of Muslim identity correlate
with a propensity for terrorism”); see also Khaled A. Beydoun, Between
Indigence, Islamophobia, and Erasure: Poor and Muslim in “War on Terror”
America, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1463, 1494–99 (2016) (examining how
counter-radicalization surveillance is disproportionately enforced against
poor, Black and Brown Muslim populations in the United States). “Digital
Islamophobia” is the use and administration of Big Data Policing philosophy,
strategy, and tools to carry national security policing, guided by the
presumption that expressions of Muslim identity are presumptive of
terrorism.
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injury that supersedes the threshold of social control and its
attendant effect of subordination on marginalized groups.
Part III turns to this Article’s focal case studythe Uyghur
in Xinjiang—and analyzes the political and legal mechanisms
that facilitate the enforcement of total surveillance against the
Muslim minority group.
Part IV turns to the digital architecture of surveillance
China established to subjugate the Uyghur in Xinjiang, focusing
on smart city policing, facial recognition cameras, and
smartphone tracking as the principal tools of total surveillance.
It then examines two additional cases studies, Uganda and
Egypt, in which sexual minorities and political dissidents are
the targets of subjugation-style surveillance administered by
the State. It closes with the shape of subjugation society theory
moving forward.
I.

SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES

In the early 1970s, French philosopher Michel Foucault
entrenched himself in the penal system.43 His work focused on
two prisons: the Neufchatel prison in Switzerland and Mettray
Penal Colony in his native France.44 The modern prison,
Foucault concluded, had evolved into a structure of
“surveillance” rather than a place of corporal detention.45 He
theorized,
[The prison] lays down for each individual his place, his body,
his disease and his death, his well-being, by means of an
omnipresent and omniscient power that subdivides itself in
a regular, uninterrupted way even to the ultimate
determination of the individual, of what characterizes him,
of what belongs to him, of what happens to him.46

43. See Roger-Pol Droit, Michel Foucault, on the Role of Prisons, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 5, 1975), https://perma.cc/C5VR-5UHG.
44. FOUCAULT, supra note 22, at 293.
45. See id. at 249 (describing prison as a “place of observation of punished
individuals”). This Article adopts David Lyon’s definition of surveillance,
which he frames as “the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal
details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction.” DAVID
LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 14 (2007).
46. FOUCAULT, supra note 22, at 197.
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As such, the modern prison—a technology in and of itself—was
as much a tool deployed for internal disciplining as it was a site
of external confinement.
For Foucault, the lessons drawn from Neufchatel and
Mettray were not limited to two European prisons or the penal
system at large. His “birth of a prison” meant something far
more, with implications far grander than the carceral state.47
Through the prison, Foucault delineated the transition from
societies of sovereignty to disciplinary societies48a shift
through which the walls and eyes of the metaphoric prison
condition the individual to gradually become “the principal of
[their] own subjugation” and, in the disciplinary society, an
agent of their own confinement.49
This Part interrogates formative surveillance theory and
the development of these grand surveillance theories that drive
scholarly examination of surveillance. Section A focuses
squarely on the works of Foucault and Deleuze, whose colloquy
continues to inform the work of surveillance scholars in the law
and beyond.50 Section B surveys critical scholar Simone
Browne’s introduction of race, namely Blackness, into this
discourse. Browne’s theory of racialized surveillance sits at the
apex of an expanding literature examining how race and racism
shape the administration of surveillance, and how marginalized
groups experience surveillance. The latter is the focus of section
C.
A.

On Punishment, Discipline, and Control

This section examines the formative surveillance colloquy
between Foucault and Deleuze, leading with their kindred
presumption that advancements in surveillance technology
47. See id. at 205 (describing prison’s numerous applications, including
treating medical patients, instructing children, supervising workers, and
putting “beggars and idlers to work”).
48. See id. at 203–04 (explaining the shift from using surveillance in
prison to using it in general society). Given its tenuous link to modern forms
of surveillance, this Article will not analyze the “Society of Punishment” in
which the power to administer direct punishment was held by the ruling party
or state. See id at 9–10.
49. Id. at 203–04.
50. A “surveillance society” is an umbrella term for the enforcement and
character of surveillance employed by the State on its polity.
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humanize state administration of surveillance. It then proceeds
with a careful analysis of the surveillance society stages derived
from the two French theorists’ formative works.
1.

Technology’s Humanizing Effect?

Foucault’s work spurred the view that technology had a
humanizing effect on the administration of surveillance.51 For
him, and proponents of Big Data Policing today, technology
mutated the conventions of policing and punishment, providing
the State with powerful tools to oversee its citizens—most
notably, its deviant actors—without having to resort to arcane
disciplinary and punitive measures.52 This presumption holds
that technology allays reliance on mass discipline and
punishment—a view strengthened by the gradual development
of new digital surveillance tools believed to optimize social
control while diminishing reliance on prison walls, iron bars,
and the corporal punishment inflicted between and beneath
them in the gallows.53
Gilles Deleuze homed in on the digital remaking of
surveillance and theorized how Foucault’s disciplinary society
at large was succumbing to a tech-driven society of control. He
observed,
But what Foucault recognized as well was the transience of
the model: it succeeded that of the societies of sovereignty, the
goal and functions of which were something quite different
(to tax rather than to organize production, to rule on death
rather than to administer life); the transition took place over
time, and Napoleon seemed to affect the large-scale
conversion from one society to the other. But in their turn
the disciplines underwent a crisis to the benefit of new forces
that were gradually instituted and which accelerated after

51. See Droit, supra note 43.
52. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data Policing in the Big
Apple, HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2014, 11:13 AM), https://perma.cc/J2HZ4S7G (last updated Sept. 14, 2014) (discussing arguments in favor of data
predictive policing, including an expected lower crime rate). This presumption
is critiqued in relation to racialized surveillance in Part I.B.
53. See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS
OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006), for a leading work on the history
and structure of the traditional American carceral state.
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World War II: a disciplinary society was what we already no
longer were, what we had ceased to be.54

The coming of the “control society,” according to Deleuze,
brought the disciplinary society to a close.55 Reliance on mass
discipline, he continued, would be rendered obsolete by the
deepening, conditioning effect of technological control.56 The
telos of modern surveillance technologies, driven by policing or
economic ends, was individual and collective control instead of
the disciplining effect curated by state-controlled surveillance.
Thus, discipline succumbed to the coming of control in the same
way that discipline did away with punishment.57
Central to Deleuze’s theory is not only how surveillance
technology changes society itself, but how systems of
technological advancement change man within it.58 In short,
Deleuze contends that technology’s capacity to surveil and
control tempered the violent inclinations of those in power;
namely, the state.59 However, like Foucault’s theory, Deleuze’s
fell short by failing to see two salient points: first, how
surveillance was differentially administered across identity
lines, such as race, religion, or class; and second, how law—and
the character of the state that enacted it—materially shaped the
scale and severity of the administration of surveillance.
In large part, the theoretical development of the existing
societies of surveillance are reflected in their generational
technologies.60 This baseline drives the theoretical conclusions
drawn by Foucault and Deleuze. Technology, for both French
theorists, shares an indirectly proportional relationship with

54. Deleuze, supra note 37, at 3.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id. at 5.
57. See id. at 3 (detailing Foucault’s recognition of the historical
transition from societies of sovereignty to societies of discipline).
58. See id. at 5–6 (“The disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of
energy, but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous
network.”).
59. See id. at 3 (comparing societies of sovereignty, which “rule on death,”
to societies of discipline, which “administer life”).
60. See id. at 6 (“Types of machines are easily matched with each type of
society—not that machines are determining, but because they express those
social forms capable of generating and using them.”).
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the disciplinary and punitive administration of surveillance.61
In short, technological advancement was said to reflect the need
for more intimate, and violent, forms of regulation.62 Violence
and discipline, according to Deleuze, were arcane and thus
aberrant forms of surveillance administration in the control
society.63 These conclusions, however, are anchored in seeing the
subjects of surveillance as a unitary bloc of western and white
targets, and in unseeing how the political context and
demographic heterogeneity of the subjects of surveillance
materially determines how surveillance is deployed and
experienced.64 With these variables missing from the colloquy
between Foucault and Deleuze, their conjoined theories
presume that technological advancement diminishes reliance on
punishment and discipline. This presumption, in turn,
humanizes surveillance.
It is this “progressive arc of surveillance” that undergirds
the pages of Foucault’s Discipline and Punishment and
Deleuze’s Postscript on the Societies of Control.65 It is a
conclusion that rises from a narrow focus on white subjects in
western capitalist societies, which renders the experiences of
nonwhite beings absent from analysis. Consequently, their
conclusions fixate too strongly on the tools of surveillance and
overlook the heterogeneity of the subjects and political
geographies in which these tools are being administered.
Before delving fully into the critique of these conclusions in
the coming section, a closer analysis of the colloquy between
Foucault and Deleuze that forms this colorblind arc of
humanized surveillance is necessary.
2.

Surveillance Society Stages

Foucault’s transition from “sovereign societies” to
“disciplinary societies” centered on modern structures of
61. See, e.g., id. at 7 (describing the substitution of the new technology of
ankle monitors for incarceration in the prison system).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Rozenshtein, supra note 30, at 99.
65. “Progressive arc of surveillance” is the presumption, formed by the
colloquy between Foucault and Deleuze, that advancements in surveillance
technology humanize the State’s administration of surveillance, which in turn
retrenches reliance on discipline and punishment as regulatory regimes.
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congregation.66 For Foucault, these structures were prisons,
schools, hospitals, factories, the family, and any and every unit
that enclosed the individual and divided her from others.67 The
prison was simultaneously the principal unit of analysis and a
metaphor for these disparate disciplinary structures.68 Prisons
stood as an architectural model that outlined the bounds of the
disciplinary society and its unprecedented capacity to surveil
the actions of those within them without having to resort to
corporal punishment.69 For Foucault, the prison was the
cutting-edge technology that transformed state regulation and
surveillance.70
Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, the English philosopher’s
eighteenth-century template of the ideal prison, served as
Foucault’s prototype.71 Foucault labeled Bentham’s schematic,
with an all-seeing watchtower at its center and tightly walled
cells surrounding it, a “marvelous machine” that “produces
homogenous effects of power.”72 The ubiquitous gaze of the boss,
the schoolteacher, the parents, or the prison warden, all of which
embody the surveillance state, make the subject perpetually
aware that she is being surveilled.73 This knowledge of being
watched, Foucault continued, had a disciplining effect,
conditioning the subject to obey state authority without having
to dispense of the physical punishment that characterized the
previous society of sovereignty.74 The coming of the disciplinary

66. See FOUCAULT, supra note 22, at 200–01 (listing the structures used
in disciplinary societies).
67. Id.
68. Foucault himself shared, “If Bentham’s project aroused interest, this
was because it [the Panopticon] provided a formula applicable to many
domains” in society. MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Eye of Power: A Conversation with
Jean-Pierre Barou and Michelle Perrot, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 146, 154 (Colin
Gordon ed., 1980).
69. FOUCAULT, supra note 22, at 249.
70. See id. (“The theme of the Panopticon—at once surveillance and
observation, security and knowledge, individualization and totalization,
isolation and transparency—found in the prison its privileged locus of
realization.”).
71. See BENTHAM, supra note 22, at 4–12.
72. FOUCAULT, supra note 22, at 202.
73. See id. at 205.
74. Id.
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society, theory holds, rendered punishment unnecessary and
aberrant.75
Further, the disciplining effect of surveillance automates
the individual to regulate herself. Even when she was not being
watched, the design of the Panopticon and its centralized gaze
made her feel like she was continuously being monitored.76 This
conscious belief of always being watched conditions the
surveilled subject to abide by the prison’s orders to avoid
punishment.77 This makes her a master of her own subjugation,
and ultimately, according to Foucault, renders the plainly
understood violence once relied on by the State unnecessary
and, ultimately, obsolete.78
As a result, the disciplinary society converted the surveilled
into its co-surveillant, simultaneously serving the master and
collaborating in her own confinement.79 In conversation with
Foucault’s conclusion that the surveilled are themselves bearers
of this disciplinary surveillance, legal scholar Tawia Ansah finds
that these inmates are “both subject and object of surveillance,
with similar effects of power produced in both by the broader
operation of the discourse.”80 This double consciousness of
surveillance, whereby the surveilled believes that she is
perpetually being monitored by the State, disciplines her
behavior—gradually and lastingly—to behave within the lines
of state regulation.

75. Id. at 206.
76. Id.
77. See id. (describing the psychological effects of surveillance on the
surveilled).
78. See FOUCAULT, supra note 22, at 202–03
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it,
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power
relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes
the principle of his own subjection. By this very fact, the external
power may throw off its physical weight; it tends to the
non-corporal; and, the more it approaches this limit, the more
constant, profound and permanent are its effects: it is a perpetual
victory that avoids any physical confrontation and which is always
decided in advance.
79. See id. at 201.
80. Tawia Ansah, Subject to Surveillance: Genocide Law as Epistemology
of the Object, 3 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 31, 59 (2010).
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The control society, the subsequent stage of societal
surveillance introduced by Deleuze, accelerated the automation
of the individual as a master of her own subjugation.81 This is
particularly the case today, when predictive algorithms serve as
the lifeline of the “surveillance economy.”82 Writing in 1992,
Deleuze foresaw how enclosed structures of disciplinary
surveillance would no longer become the exclusive sites of state
power.83 Nonstate surveillance intermediaries, including
Google, Amazon, Facebook, and other big tech actors that
burrow through their users’ information for endless streams of
data, are the makers of this societal frontier.84 The private
character of the principal agents of surveillance marks a notable
distinction from the (preceding) disciplinary society in which the
State served as the central protagonist of surveillance.85 In
control societies, the State grows reliant on the expertise of
corporations—the more efficient producers of surveillance
technology—for access to coveted data.86
Another notable distinction is the subject of surveillance.
The control society is one that regulates data, rather than
corporal bodies, through the process of “datafication,” in which
human habits detected by algorithms provide tech corporations
with a continuous pool of data to be regulated for commercial
gain.87 Deleuze theorizes that through a “[n]umerical language

81. See Deleuze, supra note 37, at 7.
82. “The entire logic of this capital accumulation is most accurately
understood as surveillance capitalism, which is the foundational framework
for a surveillance-based economic order: a surveillance economy.” ZUBOFF,
supra note 25, at 94.
83. See Deleuze, supra note 37, at 6 (“The family, the school, the army,
the factory are no longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge towards
an owner—state or private power—but coded figures—deformable and
transformable—of a single corporation that now has only stockholders.”).
84. See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 98 (2016) for an
examination of how Amazon uses collected data to identify “recidivist”
consumers.
85. See, e.g., id. at 161–78 (describing the invasive collection of data by
private insurance companies through employee wellness programs).
86. See id. at 84–85 (describing law enforcement’s use of privately created
predictive crime models).
87. See Iveson & Maalsen, supra note 38, at 333 (“Consciously or
unconsciously, urban inhabitants leave a digital trace of themselves and their
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of control” that is “made of codes that mark access to
information, or reject it[,] [w]e no longer find ourselves dealing
with the mass/individual pair” of the disciplinary society, but a
“dividual” who submits “masses, samples, data” to the
surveilling technology.88
Thus, bodies of data are the subjects of surveillance in
control societies—not corporal bodies. The individual is the
producer of that data, conditioned and controlled by the
seductive pull of ads, likes, engagement, images, and
entertainment that push individuals to keep feeding their
devices with data.89 By surrendering that data, the (in)dividual
submits her very freedom to the controlling device. With a
learning machine at its core, the device tightens its grip on the
user as it becomes more familiar with her interests and
desires,90 then systematically mines as much data as possible
from the dividual engaging with it.91
Digitally-driven control, according to Deleuze, not only
diminishes reliance on traditional prisons, but is the new prison.
Beyond the smartphone, these mobile, digital prisons are most
starkly manifested by e-carceral technologies like the
ankle-monitor, which legal scholar Chazz Arnett writes, “still
cling[s] to punitive culture” that is disproportionately imposed
on Black subjects.92

activities every time they interact with digital devices and infrastructure that
are increasingly taken-for-granted technologies of everyday life in cities . . . .”).
88. Deleuze, supra note 37, at 5.
89. See Iveson & Maalsen, supra note 38, at 333 (“At the individual level,
the datafication of our daily habits creates datasets from which curated
content is developed—services, news and entertainment, fitness and
well-being—which is fed back to us in a self-affirming loop of our habits.”).
90. See Selbst, supra note 36, at 127 (describing how machine learning
algorithms “find useful patterns and relationships in data” to predict
outcomes).
91. See, e.g., id. at 128 (describing data mining by companies such as
Twitter and Facebook).
92. Arnett, supra note 23, at 645. Arnett further articulates how the
disproportionate enforcement of e-carceration on Black subjects “only
perpetuates the role that the criminal justice system plays in entrenching a
marginalized second-class citizenship,” rebutting the colorblind presumption
that advancements in carceral technologies have a humanizing effect on the
subject. Id. at 653.

SOCIETIES OF SUBJUGATION

789

For Deleuze, the physical walls of the prison are replaced
by digital walls that control.93 The prevailing order of
surveillance capitalism that The Social Dilemma and Shoshana
Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance cautioned against manifests the
realization of Deleuze’s control society.94 Three decades later,
the “control mechanisms” stationed throughout cities,
embedded in our homes and cars, carried faithfully in our palms,
and manifested by roving digital cameras convey Deleuze’s
prescience in writing Postscript.95 He saw the coming of this era
of surveillance capitalism decades before Zuboff articulated its
ominous architecture and its embodiment within the
surveillance intermediaries that propel it.
However, his colloquy with Foucault about the arc of
surveillance societies, which envisions a neat transition from
one order to the next—punishment to discipline to control—is
itself developed through a confined scope. Foucault and Deleuze
theorized surveillance within imagined societies of similarly
situated, “unracialized” (white) beings.96 In the process, both
theorists overlooked the salience of race with regard to how
surveillance was administered by the State and experienced by
the subject.97

93. See Deleuze, supra note 37, at 7.
94. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
95. See Deleuze, supra note 37, at 7.
96. “Racialization” is defined as “an unstable and ‘decentered’ complex of
social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle” assigned
to identities in society. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S, at 55 (1994). White identity,
in western capitalist societies, often occupies the highest rung of racial
valuation. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707,
1757–78 (1993) (discussing the property value attached to whiteness, and the
legal and de facto incentives attached to passing as white).
97. In addition to the role of race, the French theorists’ analysis neglected
gender. See Angela King, The Prisoner of Gender: Foucault and the
Disciplining of the Female Body, 5 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD. 29, 29 (2004) (“Yet
despite his preoccupation with power and its effects on the body, Foucault’s
own analysis was curiously gender-neutral. Remarkably, there is no
exploration or even acknowledgement of the extent to which gender
determines the techniques and degrees of discipline exerted on the body.”).
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B.

Racialized Surveillance

“[T]he master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s
house,” wrote the Black queer feminist, Audre Lorde.98 She
penned those words in 1984, the year in which Orwell set his
dystopian novel envisioning the coming of the total surveillance
society.99 This “Orwellian” society, despite its dark outlook,
imagined the people within it as homogenously white, seated in
a western society remade in the dystopian image of a state of
total surveillance.100
By confronting the absence of race and racism in formative
surveillance theory, Simone Browne heeds Lorde’s call.
Browne’s Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness
provides vital tools to examine the impact of surveillance on
non-white bodies and subaltern groups.101 The established
orders of surveillance, shaped by two French white men, were
guided by a prism of white male normativity that, like Orwell,
saw the central subjects of surveillance as white and male.102 In
line with that narrow worldview, Foucault and Deleuze drew
high stakes conclusions about the state administration of
surveillanceand even more critically, how that surveillance
was broadly experienced.
While race is the salient marker of departure for Browne,
Blackness—or anti-Blackness—sits at the center of Browne’s
theorizing of “racialized surveillance.”103 By introducing
anti-Black state violence to the discourse on surveillance,
Browne concludes, “[d]isciplinary power did not do away with or
supplant the majestic and often gruesome instantiations of

98. AUDRE LORDE, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s
House, in SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 112, 112 (Nancy K. Bereano
ed., 1984) (emphasis omitted).
99. See generally ORWELL, supra note 20.
100. See Douglas Kerr, Law and Race in George Orwell, 29 L. & LIT. 311,
321 (2017) (“[A]ll named characters in the story seem to be white
English-speaking Europeans . . . .”).
101. See generally BROWNE, supra note 39.
102. Colorblindness presumes that systems, whether arms of the state or
private, are apathetic to race or racial difference. See Ian F. Haney López, “A
Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59
STAN. L. REV. 985, 992–96 (2007).
103. See generally BROWNE, supra note 39.
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sovereign power,” but functioned alongside it.104 Browne
challenged the colorblind presumption that technological
advancement invariably had a humanizing effect on state
surveillance and softened those in power who wield it in the
process. The character of the surveillance state, as Foucault and
Deleuze powerfully illustrate, mattered; but so did the character
of the subject of surveillance. Browne argued that
advancements in surveillance technology often had the effect of
inflicting more violence when the surveilled subjects were
Black,105 a conclusion that critical law scholars, whose work is
examined in the coming Part, echo and build on.
In the critical race studies’ tradition, Browne uses historical
examples of Black dehumanization as evidence.106 Moving the
subject of surveillance from the white citizen, Browne focuses on
the African captive on the “maritime prison,” the enslaved
woman beaten down by her oppressor before being sold on the
auction block and bonded to inhuman work conditions on cotton
fields, and the young Black man lynched for looking in the
direction of a white woman in Antebellum Georgia—vignettes of
racialized surveillance pushed beyond the bounds of the
theoretical imagination of Foucault and Deleuze.107
Technological advancement, for Browne and the Black bodies

104. Id. at 37.
105. See, e.g., id. at 92 (discussing the surveillance technology of “branding
not only as a material practice of hot irons on skin, but as a racializing act,
where the one-drop rule was a technology of branding blackness that
maintained the enslaved body as black”).
106. See id. at 23–24 (describing how surveillance technologies instituted
during slavery “to monitor and track blackness as property” anticipated “the
contemporary surveillance of racialized subjects”). Slave patrols were among
the first regimes of mass surveillance in the North American colonies, and
later, the United States. See SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND
VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE CAROLINAS 4 (2001).
107. BROWNE, supra note 39, at 32. See Khaled A. Beydoun, Antebellum
Islam, 58 HOW. L.J. 141 (2015), for an examination of how slave-masters
monitored the religious practices of enslaved African Muslims on
plantations—a de facto prison. Legal scholar Brandon Hasbrouck echoes
Browne, stating, “Since America’s founding, this assumption of dangerousness
subjected free Blacks to constant scrutiny and invasion of privacy by white
authorities,” and identifying how the surveillance of Blackness was spawned
alongside the birth of the United States as a nation. Brandon Hasbrouck,
Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thirteenth Amendment, 68 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 200, 208 (2020).
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she centers, can—and systematically did—intensify mass
punishment and discipline.
With these past chapters of Black subjugation, and the
ongoing subordination of Black bodies that continues today,
Browne concludes: “[B]oth formulations of power—sovereign
and discipline—worked together.”108 This principle of
simultaneity—the synchronized administration of punishment,
discipline, and control by state actors—forms the crux of
Browne’s argument. Simultaneity is also central to this Article’s
core argument, which extends Browne’s focus on Blackness to
subaltern identities and, specifically, to the subjugation of the
Uyghur in Xinjiang.
By interrogating the dialectic between surveillance and
Blackness, Browne disrupts the progressive arc of digital
surveillance proffered by Foucault and Deleuze.109 Through
injecting race into the surveillance narrative and centering
Black subjects as the targets of surveillance, Browne unveils
how advancements in surveillance technology did not temper
state reliance on mass discipline and punishment but rather
spurred the ensemble of the three to subjugate Black
populations then, and subordinate them today.110 Legal scholars
continue to grapple with the colorblind theory that grips
surveillance discourses, challenging the “master” discourses of
Foucault and Deleuze, and building on Browne.111
108. BROWNE, supra note 39, at 37. “[A]nti-Black surveillance still exists
as a tool to continue those legacies of racial hierarchy through control and
disruption of any efforts, demands, or movements toward racial justice.” Race,
Surveillance, Resistance, supra note 39, at 1137. For a recent treatise
analyzing how the entire enterprise of criminal policing in the United States
reifies racial hierarchy, see Eric J. Miller, Knowing Your Place: The Police Role
in the Reproduction of Racial Hierarchy, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1607 (2021).
109. See Megan M. Wood, Book Review, 14 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 286, 288
(“Dark Matters should be understood as a productive disruption of
theorizing-as-usual in Surveillance Studies.”).
110. See id. at 286 (“Browne works with an astounding amount of archival
and contemporary examples to situate blackness as a primary site through
which surveillance is rationalized, practiced, fixed, and resisted.”).
111. The absence of race and religion is curious, especially for Foucault,
given the visible presence of Arab, African, and Amazigh inmates populating
French prisons during the 1960s and 1970s that resulted from the
colony-to-prison pipeline. See, e.g., Pascal Blanchard, The Paradox of Arab
France, 21 CAIRO REV. 62, 67 (Amir-Hussein Radjy trans., 2016) (detailing the
arrest of “[o]ver ten thousand Algerians” in a protest against “the imposition
of a curfew uniquely for French Muslims” in October 1961). While the prisons
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Building on Browne and Blackness

Simone Browne’s formative work on racialized surveillance
inspires scholarly interventions that probe the convergence of
race, surveillance, and technology. This literature confronts the
progressive arc and orders of surveillance theory by shifting the
gaze away from the white subject and onto racial minority
groups. This, in turn, creates inroads for new theoretical
frameworks that give flesh, bone, and voice to the surveillance
experiences of non-white beings.
In the spirit of Browne, Safiya Umoja Noble’s Algorithms of
Oppression contests the colorblind discourses on surveillance
capitalism.112 Her work identifies that the predictive
technologies that drive the platforms and products we consume,
while they consume us for data and dollars, are neither racially
“neutral [n]or valueless.”113 Rather, Noble observes, “On the
Internet and in our everyday uses of technology, discrimination
is also embedded in computer code and, increasingly, in artificial
intelligence technologies that we are reliant on, by choice or
not.”114

and gallows are flooded with these nonwhite bodies, the racial (and Muslim)
identity of inmates is absent from Foucault’s analysis. See generally STEPHEN
A. TOTH, METTRAY: A HISTORY OF FRANCE’S MOST VENERATED CARCERAL
INSTITUTION (2019) (providing an archival history of the prison colony).
112. See SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH
ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM 1 (2018) (“While we often think of terms such as
‘big data’ and ‘algorithms’ as being benign, neutral, or objective, they are
anything but.”).
113. Race, Surveillance, Resistance, supra note 39, at 1142. Sonia M.
Gipson Rankin summarizes the prevailing view that digital surveillance is
colorblind, before examining how it reifies racial inequality: “The
implementation of AI in legal spaces has brought great promise. An array of
legal scholars, scientists, and businesses believe that embedding AI into
criminal justice reform can lead the United States to a more effective and
efficient, bias-free system no longer centered on entrenched historical racism.”
Sonia M. Gipson Rankin, Technological Tethereds: Potential Impact of
Untrustworthy Artificial Intelligence in Criminal Justice Risk Assessment
Instruments, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647, 653 (2021).
114. NOBLE, supra note 112, at 1. Beyond racial bias in algorithmic coding,
David Lyon observed, “all forms of communication technology have a ‘bias’.”
DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 23
(1994); see also Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as an Anti-Bias
Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671, 1707 (2020) (contesting the notion that
algorithmic bias is a “solely technical problem”).
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Race is not incidental to surveillance, but rather is built into
surveillance technology. Ruha Benjamin’s Race After
Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code positions
race at the center of the discussion on technology.115 She offers
that race itself must be understood as a form of political
technology, and, further, “the employment of new technologies
that reflect and reproduce existing inequities but that are
promoted and perceived as more objective or progressive than
the systems of a previous era” must be understood.116 Noble and
Benjamin’s texts contribute to a rising literature on Big Tech
that emphasizes the centrality of race and racism, and
challenges the colorblind theoretical canon that grips it.
Critical law scholars have contributed considerably to the
literature on surveillance and race, particularly in the context
of criminal policing. Chaz Arnett analyzes how Baltimore,
Maryland, has served as “a leading experimentation lab for
police surveillance technologies” incubated in the heart of the
city’s predominantly Black communities.117 Further, Arnett’s
work ties digital strategies of community policing to the punitive
outcomes of e-carceration, arguing that digital surveillance of
Black subjects exchanges traditional forms of incarceration for
“electronic correctional surveillance, such as electronic ankle
monitors,” which inflicts novel forms of mass violence and social
subordination on Black subjects.118 Jessica Eaglin examines how
actuarial risk assessments bring about longer sentences for
offenders of color.119 This subordination and maintenance of
Black second-class citizenship is not limited to criminal
offenders. As Justin Hansford and Etienne Toussaint observe,
law enforcement officers extend this subordination to Black
activists by viewing their First Amendment activity through the
racialized prism of criminality and by regularly abridging such

115. See generally RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY:
ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE (2019).
116. Id. at 5–6. Benjamin notes how “race itself is a kind of technology,”
designed and legally deployed to “separate, stratify, and sanctify the many
forms of injustice experienced by members of racialized groups.” Id. at 36.
117. Race, Surveillance, Resistance, supra note 39, at 1105.
118. From Decarceration, supra note 23, at 645.
119. Jessica Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 96
(2017).

SOCIETIES OF SUBJUGATION

795

activity.120 This policing has pivoted from traditional public
forums to social media platforms through the enforcement of
Black Identity Extremism (BIE) online to crackdown on Black
activists on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other sites of
virtual advocacy and political organizing.121
Echoing Noble in the context of criminal policing, legal
scholar Ngozi Okidegbe distills how policing algorithms deepen
existing racial inequities.122 Challenging the notion that
“technology provides a [race-neutral and] evidence-based
assessment of an individual’s statistical risk” of committing a
crime, Okidegbe surveys how novel policing strategies powered
by algorithms developed by white designers, but deployed
against communities of color, cause the disproportionate racial
inequities that they were believed to cure.123 Arnett, Eaglin,
Okidegbe, Bennett Capers, and a burgeoning cohort of other
legal scholars are deftly demystifying the notion that
algorithms, unlike their human predecessors tasked with
making high stakes policing determinations, are in fact neutral
or colorblind.124 Rather, through design choices made by
predominantly white designers, algorithms stand as innovative
new tools that perpetuate the same old racism.125

120. See Justin Hansford, The First Amendment Freedom of Assembly as a
Racial Project, 127 YALE L.J. F. 685, 704 (2018); Etienne C. Toussaint,
Blackness as Fighting Words, 106 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 124, 139 (2020).
121. For an examination of how the FBI surveils Black Lives Matter
(BLM) activists as putative security threats, see Sahar F. Aziz & Khaled A.
Beydoun, Fear of a Black and Brown Internet: Policing Online Activism, 100
B.U. L. REV. 1151, 1179–84 (2020).
122. Ngozi Okidegbe, When They Hear Us: Race, Algorithms and the
Practice of Criminal Law, 29 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 329, 334 (2020).
123. Id. at 330; see id. at 33035.
124. See I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV.
1241 (2017) (providing an analysis of how race retools the use of surveillance
technology on non-white communities); I. Bennett Capers, Techno-Policing, 15
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 495 (2018) (examining the impact of cutting-edge
surveillance technology on modern law enforcement). See generally THE RISE
OF BIG DATA, supra note 34.
125. “Because the racial effects of currently employed algorithms are not
endemic to the technology and stem from a series of design choices, it is worth
considering whether we could redesign algorithms against the reproduction of
the current racial status quo,” Okidegbe observes. Okidegbe, supra note 122,
at 334. She proposes including members of overpoliced communities in
algorithmic design teams. Id.
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While it is rapidly developing, the legal literature
examining digital surveillance focuses predominantly on race in
the American experience. Reflecting the disproportionate injury
inflicted on Black and Brown communities, this legal literature
probes the dialectic between modern fronts of policing and race
in over-policed communities of color in the United States. Recent
events—most notably the Black Lives Matter (BLM) Movement,
the murders of unarmed Black women and men, and the
collateral developments spawned by police violence—have
ignited scholarly focus on racialized surveillance. In the
American experience, race and racism are the loci of state
surveillance and policing, and oftentimes, the key variables that
determine their scale of enforcement.
This Article builds on this literature by examining the
administration of digital surveillance on communities
stigmatized along lines beyond race: lines of subaltern identity
at large. Race and racism are salient, but do not tell the whole
subaltern story of surveillance, particularly in societies where
race is not the principal marker of subordination. As illustrated
in my previous work examining War on Terror policing and the
Islamophobia it spawns, surveillance is also deployed along
lines of religious identity, and, in the United States, it
encroaches on the Free Exercise of Religion liberties of Muslims
and on associated First Amendment activity.126 In a society of
subjugation, where the shelter of constitutional protection is
pale or nonexistent, the injuries wrought by digital surveillance
are more penetrating and perilous. These injuries are the
products of a surveillance order that simultaneously inflicts
punishment, discipline, and control.
II.
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Grand theories are rooted in real places. These places can
determine these theories’ intellectual reach, spaces of relevance,
scope of resonance, and, most notably, their blind spots. This is
126. For an examination of how counter-radicalization policing infringes
on the free exercise of religion, speech, and assembly rights of Muslims in the
United States, see Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization”, 3 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 809, 868–82 (2013). For an analysis of how counter-radicalization runs
counter to the spirit of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, see
Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of
Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 127 (2012).
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particularly true for grand surveillance theories. While the
Mettray and Neufchatel prisons in western Europe inspired
Foucault’s development of the disciplinary society, this Article
is inspired by the digital architectures of surveillance
constructed in Xinjiang, China—the homeland of the Uyghur.
These surveillance technologies, which Chinese President Xi
dubs the “sharp eyes” of the State, penetrate deep into
previously unreachable spaces and corners of Uyghur life and
society.127 The use of cutting-edge digital surveillance tools to
police targeted minorities is unfolding on a global scale.128
Despite legal scholarship prioritizing its administration in the
United States, societies like China host omniscient policing
mechanisms inflicted by authoritarian rule that is bent not only
on control but also on the accompanying designs of mass
discipline and punishment.129
This Part introduces societies of subjugation into the legal
literature, providing a new theoretical framework to guide
scholarship grappling with the reach of new surveillance
strategies and architectures. Section A begins with a definition,
followed by a theoretical framework in section B, which situates
the societies of subjugation within the surveillance societies
typology.
A.

Definition

The society of subjugation is a type of surveillance society
in which the State wields surveillance technology to form a
policing architecture designed to police, persecute, and then
stamp out an oppositional minority group. Through an ensemble
127. “In 2015, China’s National Development and Reform Commission
launched a program called Sharp Eyes with the goal of achieving 100 percent
video coverage of ‘key public areas’ and ‘key industries’ by 2020.” DOMINIC J.
NARDI, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
CHINA’S HIGH-TECH SURVEILLANCE STATE 2 (2019), https://perma.cc/UFM6LEFR (PDF).
128. See Ethnic Minorities at Greater Risk of Oversurveillance After
Protests, PRIV. INT’L (June 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/EC3K-HF8W (describing
over-policing of minority communities in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Sweden).
129. See NARDI, supra note 127, at 5 (noting that the government’s
surveillance of religious behavior, houses of worship, and specific religious
minorities has left many Muslims in Xinjiang afraid to attend prayer services
in mosques); IN THE CAMPS, supra note 4.

798

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 796 (2022)

of punishment, discipline, and control, the State administers its
digital surveillance tools against an oppositional group. In so
doing, the State blurs the lines of the prevailing orders of
surveillance societies to achieve its political aim of subjugation.
Further, the subjugation society is driven by “strategic
surveillance,” through which the State aims to shore up its
authority by tracking and then repressing elements believed to
challenge its authority.130 This definition rests on Lawrence
Lessig’s baseline view that technologies “do not naturally and
inevitably tend,” but are “architectures [that] tend as we
choose.”131 Thus, like their preceding surveillance orders,
societies of subjugation capitalize on the myriad of surveillance
tools as “political technolog[ies].”132 Namely, they capitalize on
tools wielded to achieve desired political aims, chief of which is
bolstering state power by subjugating minority groups the State
marks oppositional.
Political context is key. Authoritarian regimes or states
with authoritarian aspirations engineer societies of
subjugation.133 Thus, the State—not the corporation—is the
principal spearhead of surveillance in a subjugation society. By
contrast, the Deleuzean control society is administered by
corporate management of technologies that reduce citizens into
“dividuals,” simultaneously mined for data while bonded to the
digital platforms that lord over them while planted in their
palms.134 However, there is often no meaningful private-public
divide in most authoritarian states, where the rule of law (or the
lack thereof) enables the authoritarian regime to wield
surveillance technology in line with its repressive aims.135 In
130. Sociologist Gary T. Marx defines the “conscious strategy to gather
information” from an adversarial group as “strategic surveillance.” Gary T.
Marx, Surveillance Studies, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL &
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 722, 735 (James D. Wright ed., 2015).
131. Lawrence Lessig, On the Internet and the Benign Invasions of
Nineteen Eighty-Four, in ON NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR: ORWELL AND OUR
FUTURE 212, 220 (Abbott Gleason et al. eds., 2010).
132. FOUCAULT, supra note 22, at 205.
133. Oppositionality could be a bona fide threat, or alternatively, perceived
or fabricated by the state to achieve its political objective of subjugation.
134. Deleuze, supra note 37, at 5.
135. See, e.g., Dorottya Sallai & Gerhard Schnyder, What Is
“Authoritarian” About Authoritarian Capitalism? The Dual Erosion of the
Private-Public Divide in State-Dominated Business Systems, 60 BUS. & SOC’Y
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addition, collection of the dividual’s data is often a bridge toward
seizing his or her body in the subjugation society, in turn,
removing the corporal divide between control and disciplinary
societies.
Again, regulation in control societies is produced by
remaking citizens into endless pools of data. This data is
funneled to corporations for the prime purpose of maximizing
profits.136 Conversely, in societies of subjugation, technology is
used by state agencies to extend the State’s reach into the
private quarters and minds of the subject to further the regime’s
control—or “hypercontrol”—over her.137 The legal literature
examining digital surveillance and Big Data Policing focuses
predominantly on control societies, and specifically the
American control society, where the State collaborates with
private actors to devise modern policing strategies.138
In the subjugation society, the State is the principal
protagonist of surveillance and maker of policy, enabling
unfettered authority over the administration of surveillance, its
scale, and its reach into the lives of targeted subjects.

1312, 1335–36 (2020) (noting how “institutionalized” corruption allows the
government to use the surveillance tools embedded in bureaucracy for
repressive ends, eroding the boundary between public and private).
136. ZUBOFF, supra note 25, at 71–97 (describing corporations’ discovery
that citizens “are less valuable than others’ bets on [their] future behavior”).
137. See William Bogard, Welcome to the Society of Control: The
Simulation of Surveillance Revisited, in THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE
AND VISIBILITY 55, 60 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2003)
[N]ot merely “efficient,” it is “prefficient,” that is, it eliminates
problems before they emerge, absolutely, before they even have the
chance to become problems. This is hypercontrol, an ultimate
resolution to the problem of efficiency, with all the technodeterminist, totalitarian, racist, imperial images associated with
the phrase. It is the pre-emptive strike . . . : reaction precedes
reacting, precession of reaction, finality of reaction.
138. In the western democratic context, Big Tech corporations are wholly
independent of the State. See Tom Wheeler, A Focused Federal Agency Is
Necessary to Oversee Big Tech, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://perma.cc/F22L-TMN7 (“Oversight of the dominant digital platforms’
broad effects on society is not possible within the existing federal regulatory
structure.”). Today, they hold a competing and increasingly tense relationship
with the State. See id.
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B.

Theory

Populations in authoritarian societies are not monolithic.
Like any place else, they are diverse along racial, ethnic,
religious, and converging lines. Shaping a new theoretical frame
that builds on the work of Foucault, Deleuze, and Browne must
begin with this acknowledgement. While the latter homed in on
racial heterogeneity in the United States as a marker of
difference of the surveilled subject, societies are diverse along
lines that supersede race alone. This is fundamental to
subjugation society theory, which holds that the State might
administer the surveillance mandate of subjugation along lines
of religion, sexual orientation, political affiliation, another
subaltern identity, or a matrix of several markers.
Against this heterogeneity, authoritarian regimes are
collectively wed to the aim of attaining the “compliance” of
everybody in the land.139 These are societies in which the State
seeks to remake the polity into an undifferentiated mass of
subjects. However, authoritarian societies like Egypt, Uganda,
or China are more demographically heterogeneous than their
presiding regimes choose to convey.140 Often, this heterogeneity
stands against the regime’s aim of flattening the polity into an
indistinguishable mass of subjects that are disciplined to sing
its praises, while groups that resist are cast as “oppositional,”
“pariahs,” “terrorists,” or worse.141 These indictments are the
means that enable the State’s surveillance designs of
subjugation.
This authoritarian project of singling out minority
segments that resist the State project of homogenization gives
139. This Article defines “compliance” with the Deleuzean principle of
control, whereby the State effectively submits the polity to its will through
disincentives, most notable of which are the threat of mass disciplinary and
punitive action. For a detailed analysis of the deployment of surveillance as a
tool of social control, see Christian Fuchs, Surveillance and Critical Theory, 3
MEDIA & COMMC’N 6, 6–8 (2015).
140. See, e.g., Chinese Ethnic Groups: Overview Statistics, UNC,
https://perma.cc/W8PY-4AUB (last updated Sept. 3, 2021) (noting fifty-six
different ethnic groups in China, making up about 8 percent of China’s
population).
141. See, e.g., Nathan Ruser, Documenting Xinjiang’s Detention System,
AUSTL. STRATEGIC POL’Y INST. (2020), https://perma.cc/8529-8BDA (PDF)
(identifying over 380 detention or “reeducation” camps that target Uyghurs
and other Turkic Muslim nationalities in Xinjiang in Western China).
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rise to the narrower subjugation society aim: deploying
surveillance technologies to isolate groups marked as
oppositional and then subjugate them until the State attains
their compliance. In western democracies, like the United States
or Canada, the protections that arise from citizenship buffer the
harm caused by digital surveillance.142 These buffers may be
thinning for marginalized groups, as many of the scholars
highlighted in Part I.C note, but they prevent the scale of
disciplinary and punitive harms inflicted on vulnerable
populations in authoritarian states.
Building on Browne and legal scholars probing modern
forms of racialized surveillance, the subjugation society theory
analyzes the ways in which digital surveillance is enforced to
collectively discipline and punish groups because of their
affiliation with an oppositional group.143 While race is germane
to this Article’s focus, it is only one of five forms of collective
identity that determine how the State deploys surveillance
technologies against a targeted group.
Digital surveillance, and its subjugation designs in
authoritarian states, is administered along identity lines that
include but supersede race alone. Subaltern identity, for
purposes of subjugation society surveillance, encompasses five
attendant categories: (1) race or ethnicity; (2) religion;
(3) nationality; (4) political opinion or affiliation; and
(5) membership in a social group.144 These classifications derive
from refugee and asylum law, and society of subjugation theory
142. See Michele Gilman & Rebecca Green, The Surveillance Gap: The
Harms of Extreme Privacy and Data Marginalization, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 253, 261–65 (2018) (stating that undocumented immigrants, as
noncitizens, are more vulnerable to the harmful effects of surveillance in the
United States).
143. See BROWNE, supra note 39, at 128–29 (concluding that modern forms
of surveillance and use of biometric information track with historical
commodification of Blackness).
144. Christopher C. Malwitz, Particular Social Groups: Vague Definitions
and an Indeterminate Future for Asylum Seekers, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1149, 1149
(2018). The “membership in a particular social group” is the most
indeterminable category of the five set forth in refugee and asylum law. Id. at
1151. American courts have struggled to accord on one consensus definition,
in turn, burdening petitioners with the task of demonstrating belonging to a
group persecuted on grounds of its social stigmatization. See id. at 1157–58.
This Article embraces the ambiguity of the term as a point of potential
flexibility. See id. for a review of the category’s definitional ambiguity.
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follows the logic of linking persecution to one (or more) of these
categories:145 the State imposes its digital surveillance capacity
against a target on grounds of their membership with that
group.
Groups targeted in subjugation societies often meet several
of these five identity-based categories. Legal scholar Kimberlé
Crenshaw famously theorized how “subordinate identities”
frequently overlap and “intersect.”146 This intersection exposes
those with overlapping subordinate identities to the prospect of
pronounced surveillance and pronounced harm.147 Uyghur
Muslim identity in China, examined closely in Part III.A.1,
meets at least three (ethnicity, religion, and imputed political
opinion) of the five grounds and, depending on the trier of fact,
all five (social group and nationality).148
Thus, authoritarian regimes committed to maintaining
power generally single out groups along one, or more, of these
categories. Identity, then, is tied to some political charge that
the State levies on the targeted group to justify surveillance: it
may brand them unassimilable, dissident, threatening,
subversive, or, in the global War on Terror, terrorists.149 In most
cases, the State will adopt the most expedient charge to justify
145. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1101 (“To establish eligibility for asylum or
refugee status under U.S. law, you must provide that you meet the definition
of a refugee.”). The five asylum categories provide an instructive framework to
formally think about oppositional groups. However, I am not advancing this
as the lone framework, but as one of many ways to conceive of oppositional
groups.
146. Crenshaw, supra note 40, at 1241.
147. Id. at 1252.
148. See SEAN ROBERTS, THE WAR ON UYGHURS: CHINA’S CAMPAIGN AGAINST
XINJIANG’S MUSLIMS (2020), for a popular book examining the PRC’s crackdown
on the Uyghur. See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1575 (2002), for a widely cited analysis of the post-9/11 racialization of
Muslims.
149. See DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (2003)
[hereinafter SURVEILLANCE AFTER 9/11], for a leading treatise examining how
the 9/11 terror attacks spawned wholesale formulation and enforcement of
surveillance on a global scale. Further, the War on Terror merely readapted
the violent tropes ascribed to Muslims and, more specifically, Muslim
masculinity; the baselines of these tropes were hardly novel, as law scholar
Sahar Aziz notes. “The September 11 terrorist attacks [and the War on Terror
that followed] finalized a transformation of Muslim identity that had been in
the making for decades and was grounded in European Orientalism.” SAHAR
AZIZ, THE RACIAL MUSLIM 6 (2022).
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the cardinal “myth of surveillance,” which holds that
surveillance of the entire group is vital for national security.150
This is illustrated by the War on Terror mandate to profile and
police Muslims in the United States as potential terrorists, a
baseline adopted by China to implement a regime of “total
surveillance”151 on the Uyghur in Xinjiang.152
C.

Distinctions

In addition to shifting attention away from the West, and
the United States in particular, the subjugation society expands
scholarly understanding of digital surveillance in four
fundamental ways. First, as introduced above, this resetting
reveals how identity markers beyond race may serve as the
principal basis of surveillance in other nations, such as Uganda,
where sexual minorities are the principal subjects of
surveillance.153 In Egypt, a majority-Muslim country, the Sisi
Administration has focused its digital surveillance regime
against the Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational political
movement oriented as the regime’s greatest rival.154 Both of
these cases are closely examined in Part IV.B of this Article.
While race stands as the focal identity variable that often
150. See Marx, supra note 130, at 738.
151. Total surveillance is the optimal state of surveillance whereby a
regime holds capacity to monitor every dimension of a subject’s life.
152. See SURVEILLANCE AFTER 9/11, supra note 149, at 109 (noting the
globalized impact of the United States’ “War on Terror”).
153. See Uganda: Stop Police Harassment of LGBT People, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Nov. 17, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://perma.cc/DK6B-W3JR.
Anti-homosexuality laws and surveillance have collaterally impacted
heterosexual communities as well, based on stereotypical and arbitrary
presumptions of homosexual activity, further feeding the hysteria off which
Ugandan President Museveni feeds. Id.
154. The Muslim Brotherhood are a longstanding political movement,
rooted in Egypt with deep ties throughout the Muslim world, that leverages
an Islamic ethos to mobilize grassroots support and build power. Barbara
Zollner, Surviving Repression: How Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Has Carried
On, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://perma.cc/XE7G-97HE. Sisi designated the Muslim Brotherhood, which
briefly held political power with the election of longtime Muslim Brotherhood
member Mohamed Morsy following the 2011 Revolution, as a terrorist
organization shortly after Sisi claimed the presidency in a military coup.
Ashraf El-Sharif, The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Failures, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (July 1, 2014), https://perma.cc/DP9P-AWQJ.

804

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 796 (2022)

dictates how the State prioritizes who and where to dedicate its
surveillance resources to in the United States, other markers
may be more determinative in other contexts.
Second, the deployment of digital surveillance technologies
in authoritarian states is often intended, and designed, as Part
IV illustrates, to discriminate along identity lines—instead of
merely resulting in disproportionate harms along identity
lines.155 Even more nefariously, the State forms partnerships
with corporations to develop technologies to isolate and identify
the distinct physical characteristics of ethnic minorities, such as
the Uyghur, to sharpen its surveillance efficacy.156 Beyond racial
biases written into algorithmic code, Chinese digital
surveillance tools are being specifically engineered to
distinguish Uyghur, Tibetans, and minority ethnic groups from
the majority Han.
Third, resistance to surveillance stands as a fundamental
distinction between control and subjugation societies. In the
former, activists have engaged in strategic “sousveillance,” the
process whereby citizens wield their devices—mainly their
smartphones—to capture and then disseminate evidence of
state violence and overreach.157 Darnella Frazier, the
seventeen-year-old who recorded the eight minutes and forty-six
seconds of George Floyd’s murder, illustrates the immense
power of sousveillance in western control societies.158 This mode
155. Subjugation societies could even deepen these lines, create new ones,
or shift how we think about existing racial or ethnic categories.
156. See, e.g., Drew Harwell and Eva Dou, Huawei Tested AI Software
That Could Recognize Uyghur Minorities and Alert Police, Report Says, WASH.
POST (Dec. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/XY2L-6NR2.
157. See BROWNE, supra note 39, at 54–55 (discussing “sousveillance” in
the context of runaway slaves using makeup and creating aliases to pass as
white and avoid capture). Scholars have also described this activism of
sousveillance as “watching [the State] from below.” Steve Mann, Veillance and
Reciprocal Transparency: Surveillance Versus Sousveillance, AR Glass,
Lifeglogging, and Wearable Computing, 2013 I.E.E.E. INT’L SYMP. ON TECH. &
SOC’Y 1, 3 (2013). Journalist Jascha Hoffman defines sousveillance as a
“reverse tactic: the monitoring of authorities . . . by informal networks of
regular people, equipped with little more than cellphone cameras, video blogs,
and the desire to remain vigilant against the excesses of the powers that be.”
Jascha Hoffman, Sousveillance, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 10, 2016),
https://perma.cc/YXS2-WBJH.
158. Frazier shared, “I was the one that was recording the whole thing.
I’ve seen him die. I posted the video last night, and it just went viral . . . . They
killed this man and I was right there. I was five feet away. It’s so

SOCIETIES OF SUBJUGATION

805

of surveillance resistance, and others including the “use of
umbrellas to shield people’s faces,” “spray painting over the
lenses of facial recognition cameras,” or “wearing face paint to
confuse cameras,” would be met with harsh punishment in
subjugation societies, and in light of this state response, are
wholly avoided.159 For the Uyghur in Xinjiang, the possibility of
popular resistance against the Chinese subjugation society—as
Part III.B illustrates—is stifled heavily by the State’s campaign
of subjugation.
Fourth, the scale of harm distinguishes the outcomes of
digital surveillance in authoritarian states from their
deployment in democratic societies. Instead of holding
citizenship and the slate of constitutional rights that emanate
from it, subjects of authoritarian states are afforded very little
protection from the reach of surveillance160or, as illustrated by
the experience of the Uyghur in Xinjiang, no protection at all.161
While legal scholars lament the rise of authoritarian practices
in democratic states, particularly during the expansion of
surveillance during the global “War on Terror,” subjugation
societies are uninhibited in their use of surveillance
technologies to punish their opposition and entrench their
power.162 Democratic control societies, at least outwardly, are
bound by legal and public checks on surveillance overreach.
While it remains “important for the society of control to
maintain the illusion of freedom,” there are no such illusions in
subjugation societies.163

traumatizing.” Celia Fernandez, “If It Wasn’t for Me 4 Cops Would’ve Still Had
Their Jobs”: Teen Who Recorded George Floyd’s Arrest Defends Herself Against
Online Backlash, INSIDER (May 30, 2020, 3:39 PM), https://perma.cc/4ARXXF9P.
159. See Race, Surveillance, Resistance, supra note 39, at 1125–27
(outlining the distinct forms of sousveillance adopted by activists in China
during the 2019 Hong Kong protests).
160. See, e.g., BROWNE, supra note 39, at 23–24 (describing surveillance
methods used against enslaved persons and how these persons had no shelter
from surveillance).
161. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 148.
162. See Giroux, supra note 35, at 14 (describing how the United States
corporate-state surveillance apparatus was revealed by Snowden to be an
authoritarian “turnkey”).
163. Cameron Crain, Living in a Society of Control, MANTLE (2018),
https://perma.cc/3SA8-VZUU.
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This distinction is critical to this Article’s theory of the
subjugation society as a distinct type of surveillance society.
Unlike in the control society theorized by Deleuze, where “we
know that we are being tracked, but are encouraged not to worry
about it,”164 the society of subjugation weaponizes that
knowledge to impose piercing forms of punishment and
discipline. Such punishment and discipline include those latent
forms internalized by Uyghur subjects who are conditioned to
underperform and conceal their bona fide identities by “acting”
less Uyghur and Muslim and more Chinese and Han.165 This
phenomenon is closely examined in Part IV.A.4.
This subjugation suppresses the very thought of dissidence,
self-expression, and, as Chaz Arnett compellingly writes, “the
possibilit[y] for resistance.”166 In subjugation societies, the State
mandate of control synchronizes with accompanying systems of
mass discipline and violence that are designed to suffocate
resistance, and, ultimately, submit the targeted group to the
State’s will. State enforcement of digital surveillance, as
illustrated in Xinjiang, is blended and blurred by the State until
the stages of surveillance theorized by Foucault and Deleuze
become an indistinguishable ensemble.
III. (UN)MADE IN CHINA
“My brother passed away in East Turkistan [Xinjiang]. It’s
been hard for us being so far away; we are completely helpless.
We can’t even send money because we might put the rest of the
family in danger.”167
[Four days later] “We just got news that they were forced to
give him a Chinese funeral . . . . There is no tombstone allowed.

164. Id.
165. Cf. Khaled A. Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 HARV. C.R. & C.L. L. REV.
1, 6–7 (2018) [hereinafter Acting Muslim] (explaining how Muslim Americans
grapple with “the making over of religious identity, compelled by counterterror
law and the fear of appearing to be Muslim”).
166. Race, Surveillance, Resistance, supra note 39, at 1125–41.
167. Direct message from a Uyghur refugee, Rima R., now living in
Melbourne, Australia, INSTAGRAM (Nov. 27, 2020) (name changed to protect
anonymity).
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Just a number at the grave. No identity, just a number. He was
#770.”168
This Article now turns to the setting that inspired the
subjugation society and its attendant theory: Xinjiang. The
province in northwest China is an “incubator” for the world’s
most sophisticated surveillance technologies, which are
deployed to subjugate, then stamp out, the Uyghur.169 Before
examining the digital architecture of surveillance assembled to
subjugate the Uyghur, this Part examines the political and legal
campaigns that sow the seeds for the subjugation society erected
in Xinjiang.
As a test lab for the world’s most cutting-edge surveillance
technologies, Xinjiang is the most compelling subjugation
society case study and this Article’s focal case study. Further, it
is an ideal place to commence continued analysis of other
subjugation societies around the world.
A.

Uyghur Identity and Society

This section surveys Uyghur identity and society. It
examines the distinct cultural and religious customs that
prompt the Chinese regime to surveil and subjugate the Uyghur.
1.

A Muslim Minority

Before it bore the name “Xinjiang,” the territory, home to
fourteen million Uyghur in northwest China, was called East
Turkistan.170 The land, bordering Turkic nations like
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to the west and Mongolia to the
east,171 sits along the ancient Silk Road—a gateway linking

168. Direct message from a Uyghur refugee, Rima R., now living in
Melbourne, Australia, INSTAGRAM (Dec. 1, 2020) (name changed to protect
anonymity).
169. See Chris Buckley & Paul Mozur, How China Uses High-Tech
Surveillance to Subdue Minorities, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019),
https://perma.cc/T7CD-3BUB.
170. For a brief history of East Turkistan from a Uyghur perspective, see
Brief History, WORLD UYGHUR CONG., https://perma.cc/SD7Y-XYBN.
171. “Turkic nations” are a group of states in Central and West Asia where
the populations speak Turkic languages.
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China to vital regional and global markets.172 Xinjiang’s
economic importance, geographic proximity, abundant
resources, and size figure heavily into Beijing’s interest in the
territory and, because of this, drive its mandate to subjugate
and suppress the Uyghur.173
The Chinese government views Uyghur identity and
culture as subversive in and of itself.174 In 1944, during the
Chinese Civil War between the Nationalists and Communists,
the Uyghur established the East Turkistan Republic.175 This
independent nation-state would only last four years. In 1949,
the victorious People’s Liberation Army of China annexed the
coveted territory and renamed it “Xinjiang”—which means “new
frontier” in Mandarin.176 Since then, the Uyghur have lived
under the thumb of the Communist government in Beijing and
remained vulnerable to its integrated campaign of ethnic,
political, and religious persecution.177
Islam remains intrinsic to Uyghur identity.178 The
population in Xinjiang closely adheres to the faith, and Uyghur
script adopts the Arabic rooted in the Qur’an—Islam’s holy
book.179 Therefore, the fundamental rituals and symbols of
Muslim life permeate Uyghur culture and society.180 The
mosque is a center of religious, social, and civic gathering; the
imam181 serves as a community leader beyond the mosque; and
the notion of a transnational Muslim community (ummah)
172. See Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and
Road Initiative, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://perma.cc/J3CE-FUQV
(last updated Jan. 28, 2020, 7:00 AM).
173. Matthew Moneyhon, Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s
“New Frontier”, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 120, 120–21 (2002). Xinjiang
comprises roughly one-sixth of China’s landmass. Xinjiang also “contains huge
coal and oil reserves, believed to be three times those of the United States.” Id.
at 121.
174. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 148.
175. Id. at 126–27.
176. Id.
177. See generally id.
178. See Colin Mackerras, Ethnicity in China: The Case of Xinjiang, 8
HARV. ASIA Q. 4, 9 (2004) (highlighting how restrictions of religious freedom in
Xinjiang may have further entangled Islam and Uyghur identity).
179. See id.
180. See id. at 10–15.
181. The Imam is the spiritual head of the mosque.
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figures heavily into Uyghur custom.182 Beijing views these
pillars of Islamic life as barriers to assimilating the Uyghur.183
Turkic ethnicity and nationhood are another cornerstone of
Uyghur identity. “In addition to religious affinity, Uighur
ethnicity resembles and overlaps with that of its Central Asian
neighbours, such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and other
countries populated with predominantly Turkic peoples.”184
Shared ethnicity and history breeds affinity among the Uyghur
with neighboring Turkic societies, while linguistic ties bridge
greater political solidarity and cultural exchange.185 Naturally,
the Han-controlled government looks on these ties with great
suspicion. Beyond Uyghur aspirations for self-determination,
Beijing also fears transnational unity among the (Turkic)
Central Asian states that orbit Xinjiang.186 After all, Bishkek
and Tashkent, the capitals of the Turkic nations of Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan, are far closer to Xinjiang than the major
Chinese cities along the coastline.187
Physical appearance is another unifier between the Uyghur
and their Turkic neighbors. Uyghurs look more Turkic than
Han, differentiating them phenotypically from the ruling
Han.188 This marks another divide that the State seizes on to
root its campaign of subjugation and push its program of Han
182. For a survey of Uyghur religious life, and the salience of Islam to
Uyghur culture and society in Xinjiang, see GARDNER BOVINGDON, THE
UYGHURS: STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND (2010).
183. See id. at 51–58.
184. Khaled A. Beydoun, China Holds One Million Uighur Muslims in
Concentration Camps, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/2NDTDE68.
185. For a comprehensive history of the Uyghur of Xinjiang’s historical ties
with its neighboring Turkic societies, currently formed into nation-states, see
Kwang-tzuu Chen & Fredrik T. Hiebert, The Late Prehistory of Xinjiang in
Relation to Its Neighbors, 9 J. WORLD PREHISTORY 243 (1995).
186. See Paul Kubicek, Regionalism, Nationalism and Realpolitik in
Central Asia, 49 EUROPE-ASIA STUD. 637, 638–41 (1997) (identifying factors
promoting cooperation and possible integration between Central Asian states
including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and
Tajikistan).
187. Id.
188. See Brent Crane, A Tale of Two Chinese Muslim Minorities, DIPLOMAT
(Aug. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/U9F3-M7RY (explaining that the Uyghurs
“are as distinct in appearance from the Han Chinese as Native Americans are
from their Caucasian counterparts”).
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supremacy. Looking Uyghur, in addition to practicing Islam and
the cultural customs that emanate from their distinct ethnicity
and religion, clashes with the Han supremacist aspirations of
the state.189
2.

Han Supremacy

The racial dimension of Beijing’s persecution of the Uyghur
is central to understanding China’s subjugation society. The
Han, the majority ethnic group that holds power, view the
Uyghur as an obstacle to its Sinicization effort.190 While China
remains “an incredibly diverse nation with fifty-six recognized”
ethnicities, the Han are keen on flattening Chinese identity into
a mold made exclusively in their image.191 Akin to white
supremacy, Han supremacy is built on the belief that its
customs, traditions, and ideals are superior to those of minority
ethnicities and that Chinese society should be engineered in its
image.192 This ethnic supremacy is expedited by Communism,
which blends the aim of political homogenization with the
campaign of imposed (ethnic and cultural) assimilation.193
The claim of Uyghur indigeneity to Xinjiang stands as a
threat to this state project. A leading Chinese official declared,
at a United Nation’s Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
hearing, that “China has no indigenous people,” confirming the
State’s dismissal of Uyghur claims of indigeneity and claims of

189. See Hannah Beech, If China Is Anti-Islam, Why Are These Chinese
Muslims Enjoying a Faith Revival?, TIME (Aug. 12, 2014, 5:30 AM),
https://perma.cc/4F8X-RGEY (eliciting this assertion through a comparison
between the Hui Muslims, who live in China’s interior, and the Uyghur
Muslims, who predominantly live in Xinjiang).
190. See Brennan Davis, Being Uyghur . . . with “Chinese Characteristics”:
Analyzing China’s Legal Crusade Against Uyghur Identity, 44 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 81, 87 (2019) (noting a long history of Han feelings of superiority, and the
persecution of minority groups by the ruling government).
191. Id. at 83.
192. See id. at 85 (explaining that after the establishment of the Republic
of China, the government stressed that “the country was home to only one
people, the Chinese people, and that the supposedly distinct groups of the
republic were merely subvarieties of a common stock” (citation omitted)).
193. Id. at 86–88.
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independence.194 Further, the statement manifests the
Communist regime’s rewriting of Chinese history to align with
its political interests and exposes the telos of the digital
surveillance campaign enforced against the Uyghur.195 For the
Communist regime in Beijing, Chinese equals Han, and Han
“blood” stands as the marker of racial superiority.196
The perseverance of Uyghur nationhood in Xinjiang
conflicts with Beijing’s assimilatory project. China’s Sinicization
campaign is an “inherently imperial project” that seeks to
punish the expression of Uyghur identity along ethnic, religious,
and political lines.197 It embodies the full-scale “barbarism”
delineated by postcolonial thinker Aimé Césaire, whereby
colonial subjects are commodified into objects that satiate the
imperial power.198 While elements among the Uyghur remain
committed to the restoration of an East Turkistan, the state of
subjugation has eliminated virtually all forms of resistance
within Xinjiang.199 Again, this stands as a fundamental
distinction between the subjugation society and the control
society, where sousveillance and other forms of collective actions
against state surveillance are not only possible but, as Arnett

194. Statement by Counsellor Yao Shaojun of the Chinese Delegation at
the 15th Session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (May 10,
2016), https://perma.cc/U7YG-44EA.
195. See MARGARET HILLENBRAND, NEGATIVE EXPOSURES: KNOWING WHAT
NOT TO KNOW IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2020), for a critical examination of
China’s strategic disavowal of past events and incidents to further the regime’s
political aims.
196. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE
NEW NATIONALISM 5 (1993) (arguing that as a moral ideal, nationalism justifies
the “use of violence in defense of one’s nation against enemies, internal or
external”).
197. Michael Clarke, China and the Uyghurs: The “Palestinianization” of
Xinjiang?, 22 MIDDLE E. POL’Y, Fall 2015, at 127, 128 [hereinafter
Palestinianization].
198. AIMÉ CÉSAIRE, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM 47 (2000). Aimé Césaire
theorizes how colonialism degrades the colonizer and its “soul,” and through
its pillaging and plunder of colonized peoples, reduces it to barbarism. See
generally id.
199. See Austin Ramzy & Chris Buckley, “Absolutely No Mercy”: Leaked
Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/FJ9U-NUVT (detailing the extent of China’s
subjugation of Uyghurs and the crackdown on all forms of resistance to this
policy, even within the government).
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Today,
Uyghur
resistance
documents,
formidable.200
predominantly takes place outside China, rising from Uyghur
diaspora groups in countries like Australia, England, and the
United States.201 Resistance against the Chinese subjugation
society has been rooted firmly beyond the borders of Xinjiang,
and far from the bounds of China.
Stamping out dissent and resistance among the Uyghur in
Xinjiang is part of the broader project of subjugation. Within
this landscape of total surveillance, visible expressions of
Uyghur identity are often interpreted as an affront to Chinese
authority.202 As detailed above, Uyghur identity is most visible
through the practice of Islam—by way of dress, grooming, and
the myriad forms of “acting Muslim” in a surveillance state
where even benign expression triggers suspicion.203 Religious
exercise, therefore, is how Beijing often fixates its subjugation
strategy on the Uyghur.204 With Islam standing as the lifeline of
Uyghur society, China has turned its surveillance campaign
toward the faith, and its cornerstone practices, to subjugate the
Uyghur.205 This aim was already in process before 9/11, but it
was accelerated by the global War on Terror—an American
“imperial” project that emboldened crackdowns on Muslim
populations across the world—that followed.206

200. Race, Surveillance, Resistance, supra note 39, at 1125–27.
201. See Shafik Mandhai, Uighurs Marking “Independence Day” Call for
International Help, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/VUF7-3BX6.
202. See Maizland, supra note 7 (“The Chinese government has come to
characterize any expression of Islam in Xinjiang as extremist . . . .”).
203. See Acting Muslim, supra note 165, in which the Author defines
“acting Muslim” as the process by which Muslim Americans strategically
negotiate and publicly perform a religious identity stigmatized by
counterterror policy.
204. “Where the Soviets broke you, made you confess to invented charges,
and then killed you, the Chinese wanted to remake its citizens.” Phil Tinline,
How Orwell Foretold the Remaking of Xinjiang, NEW STATESMAN (July 29,
2020), https://perma.cc/8JNA-BDX8 (last updated Sept. 9, 20210, 2:14 PM).
205. See Mackerras, supra note 178, at 10–11.
206. “[The War on Terror] is best understood, in its myriad and
ever-changing manifestations, as rooted in empire. Thus, Muslims’ inclusion
within an imperial system that presides over war, genocide, and tortures does
little to dent racism.” DEEPA KUMAR, ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE POLITICS OF
EMPIRE 8 (2021).
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From Criminals to Terrorists

This section examines the modern arc of state surveillance
against the Uyghur in Xinjiang. It begins by analyzing the
political and legal means leveraged by the State to persecute the
Uyghur that preceded the development of the digital
architecture of surveillance that deepens their subjugation
today.
1.

“War on Terror” Interest Convergence

“September 11, 2001 was a world event but it was also a
globalized event,” observed surveillance scholar David Lyon,
pointing to how the ensuing War on Terror developed into an
international crusade to conquer “Islamic terrorism.”207 Nearly
a month after 9/11, President George W. Bush landed in Beijing
to enlist China as a War on Terror ally.208 Standing alongside
(then) President Jiang Zemin, Bush stated, “[w]e have a
common understanding of the magnitude of the threat posed by
international terrorism,” after meetings in which Zemin briefed
Bush about the “security” concerns posed by the Uyghur.209 With
Beijing’s interest of subjugating the Uyghur converging with the
pressing American mandate of combating global terrorism, the
stage was set for an accelerated crackdown on Uyghur life in
Xinjiang.210
The “War on the Uyghur people” was commenced in the
days after Bush’s visit.211 In line with American War on Terror
speak and strategy, Beijing instantly conflated Uyghur identity
with terrorism after 9/11, exchanging the labels of “criminals”

207. SURVEILLANCE AFTER 9/11, supra note 149, at 109.
208. See Phelim Kine, How China Hijacked the War on Terror, POLITICO
(Sept. 9, 2021, 7:06 PM), https://perma.cc/2HZR-6Y32 (Sept. 10, 2021, 1:34
PM) (noting that President Bush praised the United States and China’s “joint
anti-terrorism focus”).
209. Robin Wright & Edwin Chen, Bush Says China Backs War on Terror,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2001, 12:00 AM), https://perma.cc/YV23-DJRR.
210. See Akbar Shahid Ahmed, China Is Using U.S. “War on Terror”
Rhetoric to Justify Detaining 1 Million People, HUFFPOST (Dec. 2, 2018, 9:07
PM), https://perma.cc/MQM7-TGER (explaining that while the United States
is the leading critic of China’s Uyghur policy, it also “[laid] the groundwork for
it to succeed”).
211. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 148.
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and “subversives” for “terrorists.”212 State police began to openly
associate benign expression of faith with terrorism.213 Islamic
institutions and leaders were linked to foreign terror groups.214
Beijing’s strategy behind this structural “Islamophobia”215 was
not counterterrorism but to exploit counterterrorism and its
War on Terror vocabulary to legitimize its preexisting
Sinicization and Han supremacy campaigns.216
The State’s reframing from criminals to terrorists also
marked a strategic shift: religion, more potently than ethnicity,
became the locus of Beijing’s surveillance strategy. Reversing
the direction of Derick Bell’s “interest convergence” theory
toward spurring human rights regress instead of civil rights
progress, 9/11 and the War on Terror aligned with Beijing’s
preexisting suppression of the Uyghur.217 More ominously for
the Uyghur, the War on Terror handed the state virtual carte
blanche to intensify its campaign under the guise of combating
Islamic terrorism.218 As a result, Chinese Islamophobia rose
considerably, spurred by the global War on Terror and the

212. “China tapped into the prevailing anger at Islamic extremists
Thursday by calling for international backing for its effort to quell Muslim
[Uyghur] separatists in the western region of Xinjiang,” Chinese officials
stated during President Bush’s meeting with President Zemin on October 18,
2001. Wright & Chen, supra note 209.
213. See generally Michael Clarke, China’s “War on Terror” in Xinjiang:
Human Security and the Cases of Violent Uyghur Separatism, 20 TERRORISM
& POL. VIOLENCE 271 (2008) [hereinafter War on Terror] (examining the
credibility of Chinese allegations of the Uyghur “terrorist” threat).
214. See Beina Xu et al., The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://perma.cc/AQE2-F74D (last updated Sept.
4, 2014, 8:00 AM) (noting that China has linked ETIM, among other Uyghur
groups to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, despite those groups denying any
connection).
215. Islamophobia is “the presumption that Islam is inherently violent,
alien, and inassimilable. Combined with this is the belief that expressions of
Muslim identity are correlative with a propensity for terrorism.” Khaled A.
Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward A Legal Definition and Framework, 116
COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 108, 111 (2016) [hereinafter Islamophobia].
216. See Davis, supra note 190, at 87 (highlighting the broader history of
the Chinese government’s long-term project to reinforce Han supremacy).
217. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (theorizing how the
global geopolitical current shapes domestic policy).
218. See Exporting Islamophobia, supra note 19, at 93–96.
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state-sponsored Islamophobia the United States exported by
way of war, policy, and propaganda.219
The traditional appearances and customs of the Uyghur
corroborated the stereotypical images propagated by western
and, subsequently, state-controlled Chinese media. This
facilitated Beijing’s conflation of Uyghur identity with terrorism
as it made that case to the United States and its War on Terror
allies. 220 The Uyghur, like their coreligionists in the United
States, were swiftly branded putative terrorists.221 Uyghur men
donning beards and women wearing headscarves were branded
“radicals,” matched by Beijing with stereotypes disseminated by
American propaganda.222 This “redeployment of old Orientalist
tropes” was not only a post-9/11 American phenomenon, but also
one that rose to the fore in Xinjiang.223 Virtually overnight, 9/11
flipped the State’s formal framing of its Sinicization efforts in
Xinjiang. The State shifted away from its policy of suppressing
Turkic separatism in Xinjiang, instead dubbing it “the ‘main
battlefield’ in China’s fight against terrorism.”224 As a result,
religion—and, particularly, outward expression of Muslim
identity—increasingly became the focus of the State’s
surveillance and conjoined counterterror crackdown.225
Two decades into the War on Terror, the Chinese crackdown
on the Uyghur continues to be driven by the Islamophobic trope
that ascribes suspicion of terrorism to expression of Muslim
identity. Wang Li, China’s Foreign Minister, justified the mass
discipline and violence against the Uyghur as in line with
pressing global War on Terror aims, stating: “It’s the necessary
way to deal with Islamic or religious extremism. . . . [China’s]
efforts are completely in line with the direction the international
219. See id.
220. See Ahmed, supra note 210 (discussing how China presented Uyghur
seeking autonomy as a religious militant group based on the United States’
and other countries’ policies negatively affecting Muslims).
221. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege, Japanese American
Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Americans as “Terrorists”, 8 ASIAN AM. L.J.
1, 12 (2001).
222. See EVELYN ALSULTANY, ARABS AND MUSLIMS IN THE MEDIA (2012), for
a critical examination of the most prominent stereotypes of Muslim men and
women after the 9/11 terror attacks.
223. Volpp, supra note 148, at 1586.
224. Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression, supra note 7, at 11.
225. See Maizland, supra note 7.
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community has taken to combat terrorism, and are an important
part of the global fight against terrorism.”226 With Uyghur
identity tied to terrorism, the War on Terror continues to
furnish Beijing with the “moral ‘blank check’ for [the] human
rights abuses” against the Uyghur it long coveted.227
The transnational political mandate of combating Islamic
terrorism rooted by the War on Terror was supplemented by
domestic federal law. In June of 2012, the National People’s
Congress of China enacted legislation that made way for the
draconian Strike Hard On Terror Campaign.228 The new
“Counterterror Law of 2012” was built on the preventative and
preemptive strike logic of the War on Terror.229 In line with its
design, which afforded the state with broad latitude to levy
terror suspicion on anybody, Uyghur subjects who committed no
crime at all were arrested and detained under suspicion of
terror.230 The Counterterror Law was followed by additional
policing campaigns that, in the years that followed, pronounced
the crackdown on Uyghur life in Xinjiang.231
2.

“Strike Hard on Terror”

Buoyed by the global War on Terror, Beijing commenced its
Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign in 2014.232
President Xi steered his administration’s focus toward “three
evil forces”: separatism; extremism; and, most forcefully,

226. Ahmed, supra note 210.
227. Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression, supra note 7, at 12.
228. Opinions on Several Issues on the Application of Law in Cases of
Terrorist Activities and Extremism Crimes, CHINA L. TRANSLATE (June 12,
2018), https://perma.cc/FYF6-K3X2 [hereinafter Chinese Counterterror Law
of 2012].
229. “[Terrorism] also includes individuals preparing to carry out, or
currently carrying out, terrorist activities.” Id. (provided in § I(2)(4) of the law).
230. See Maizland, supra note 7 (noting that more than 15,000 Xinjiang
residents who were surveilled for being “suspicious” were placed in detention
centers).
231. For an examination of the distinct threats faced by the Uyghur during
the pandemic, see Vaishnavi Chaudry, The Impact of COVID-19 on Uyghur
Muslims: An Ignored Crisis, LSE HUM. RTS. (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://perma.cc/4R8H-SC6K.
232. Wang, supra note 17.
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terrorism, in line with Washington’s counterterror mandate.233
The Strike Hard Campaign aimed to crush separatist elements
and restrict “illegal religious activities” under the banner of
fighting terror.234 This isolated religious expression forms the
focus of the State’s surveillance campaign against the
Uyghur.235
The Campaign took a sharp turn in 2016, coupling the
surveillance aim of control with draconian programs of mass
discipline and punishment. On August 29 of that year, President
Xi appointed hardliner Chen Quanguo to serve as Xinjiang’s
Communist Party Secretary.236 Shortly after assuming that role,
Quanguo ordered the mass arrest and detention of Uyghur in
major cities, intensifying the preemptive counterterror mandate
of the 2012 counterterror laws.237 Most notably, he ushered in
the rapid expansion of Xinjiang’s network of concentration
camps.238 According to Darren Byler, a leading expert on China’s
total surveillance state:
[The network of concentration camps] targeted the entire
Muslim population of 15 million people in Xinjiang. It
precipitated a criminalization of Islamic practice and a
number of Uyghur and Kazakh cultural traditions. Initially
only religious leaders were sent to camps, but by 2017 the
war on terror became a program of preventing Uyghurs from
being Muslim and, to a certain extent, from being Uyghur or
Kazakh.239

233. Sarah A. Topol, Her Uighur Parents Were Model Chinese Citizens. It
Didn’t Matter., N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/85JM-ZVGE.
234. See Dana Carver Boehm, China’s Failed War on Terror: Fanning the
Flames of Uighur Separatist Violence, 2 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L.
61, 94 (2009).
235. War on Terror, supra note 213, at 279–80.
236. See Maizland, supra note 7 (“Arbitrary detention became widely used
by regional officials under Chen Quanguo, Xinjiang’s Communist Party
secretary, who moved to the region in 2016 . . . .”).
237. See Chinese Counterterror Law of 2012, supra note 228; see also
Austin Ramzy & Chris Buckley, “Absolutely No Mercy”: Leaked Files Expose
How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16,
2019), https://perma.cc/JN47-68TX (noting the Xinjiang leadership “settled on
plans to detain Uighurs in large numbers,” following Chen’s order to “[r]ound
up everyone who should be rounded up”).
238. Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression, supra note 7, at 17.
239. INSIDE THE CAMPS, supra note 4, at 18–19.
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The concentration camps thus illustrated the State’s
anti-Muslim fixation, which was entwined with ethnic animus
but stood atop the State’s matrix of determining and deploying
subjugation.
Within these broad ambitions, the concentration camps
became the signature programs of mass discipline and
punishment against the Uyghur.240 Under Quanguo, thirty-nine
camps tripled in size between April 2017 and August 2018 to
accommodate the incarceration of more Uyghur and ethnic
Muslims.241 This expansion was heavily subsidized by the
federal
government
as
“construction
spending
on
security-related facilities in Xinjiang increased by 20 billion
yuan (around $2.96 billion) in 2017.”242 As Foucault aptly
observes, the concentration camp—a form of prison—is not only
a surveillance technology itself, but a structure that enables
continuous and unfettered monitoring of its subjects.243 But,
diverging from Foucault’s theorizing of the Panopticon, the
administration of punitive violence coexists with discipline
within the camps—as graphically illustrated by the corporal and
psychological torture inflicted en masse within the camps.244
Punitive violence and discipline, as illustrated in this Article’s
vignette, are entwined surveillance strategies enforced on
Jelilova and the millions of Uyghur prisoners inside the camps.
Again, punitive violence is not aberrant, but operative to the
state’s surveillance regime.
Beijing supplemented its expanded concentration camp
program by quartering spies in Uyghur homes. Since 2014,
President Xi has quartered Communist Party members inside
Uyghur homes to monitor and report “extremist” behavior.245
This tentacle of the Strike Hard Campaign, dubbed the

240. China restricts foreign journalists from entering the camps. Matt
Schiavenza, Why It’s Difficult for Journalists to Report from Xinjiang, ASIA
SOC’Y (May 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/T97Y-FWJ9.
241. Maizland, supra note 7.
242. Id.
243. FOUCAULT, supra note 22, at 200–01.
244. See generally IN THE CAMPS, supra note 4.
245. See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, CHINA: RECOMMENDED
COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 4 (2019), https://perma.cc/49C7-ZFRT
(explaining that local government workers live in Muslim households and
assess the family’s ideological views); see also NARDI, supra note 127, at 2.
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“Becoming Family” program, diverted one million Communist
Party members, overwhelmingly Han, into Uyghur homes.246
The compulsory homestay program converted private homes
into perpetual surveillance stations, where activities such as
praying, fasting during Ramadan, speaking Uyghur, and eating
halal (Islamically blessed) meat are cited as violations of the
counterterror laws.247 In 2016, Quanguo assigned “200,000
[more Communist] cadres from government agencies,
state-owned enterprises, and public institutions” to Xinjiang to
bolster the Becoming Family surveillance strand of the Strike
Hard Campaign.248
The punitive effects of the Strike Hard Campaign were
immediate and spectacular. Arbitrary arrests proliferated, the
Islamic Holy Month of Ramadan was banned in Xinjiang in
2015, and the presence of Communist Party informants
increased in religious spaces and private homes.249 Another
“anti-extremism” law was enacted in 2017, this time explicitly
prohibiting Uyghur men from growing long beards and women
from wearing hijab in public.250 The new law also prohibited
Uyghur from decorating their homes with Islamic emblems (like
crescents and stars) or placing them atop mosques or cultural
centers.251 “In the eyes of Beijing, all Uyghurs could potentially
be terrorists or terrorist sympathizers,” a formal state view that
made every conceivable form of Islamic expression in Xinjiang
suspicious to the State and ushered in heightened forms of mass
discipline and collective punishment.252

246. Wang, supra note 17.
247. The halal food prohibition was “heralded by government officials as
fighting a fictional pan-halal trend under which Muslim influence was
supposedly spreading into secular life.” For Uyghur Muslims in China, Life
Keeps Getting Harder, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/3FCHWFKD.
248. Wang, supra note 17.
249. Jon Sharman, China “Forcing Muslims to Eat Pork and Drink
Alcohol” for Lunar New Year Festival, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 7, 2019, 1:37 PM),
https://perma.cc/L3ER-P4V3.
250. Maizland, supra note 7.
251. Palestinianization, supra note 197, at 130.
252. Maizland, supra note 7.
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3.

Engineering Subjugation

The Strike Hard Campaign mutated China’s Sinicization
mandate into full-scale persecution of the Uyghur. Scholars and
human rights advocates have dubbed China’s designs a
“genocide” or “cultural genocide,” while others have labeled it
ethnic cleansing.253 On the eve of Joe Biden’s inauguration as
President of the United States, outgoing President Trump’s
Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, formally accused China of
“committing genocide and crimes against humanity in
Xinjiang.”254 In line with these findings, this Article echoes the
cultural genocide framing to elucidate the scale of mass
discipline and punishment that the state inflicts on the
Uyghur.255
The concentration camps provide the starkest examples of
mass discipline and punishment imposed on the Uyghur. The
cornerstone of Beijing’s subjugation strategy in Xinjiang, the
swelling network of camps spread throughout the massive
province show no sign of slowing down in scale or number of
detainees.256 Every stratum of Uyghur society, from
rank-and-file workers to “singers, musicians, novelists, scholars,
and academics” have been detained in the camps.257 A
staggering 11.5 percent of the Muslim population between the
ages of twenty and seventy-nine currently are, or have been,

253. Preston Jordan Lim, Applying International Law Solutions to the
Xinjiang Crisis, 22 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 90, 94–107 (2020). Erkin Alptekin,
the (former) president of the World Uyghur Congress framed the crisis in
terms of cultural genocide, stating, “[t]he Chinese want to replace us with their
own people as colonists, and assimilate those of us who remain, wiping out our
culture.” War on Terror, supra note 213, at 274.
254. Bill Chappell, Pompeo Accuses China of Genocide Against Uyghur
Muslims, NPR (Jan. 19, 2021, 4:18 PM), https://perma.cc/UV2C-UUR7.
255. The circumstance is fluid and could devolve into genocide if the
concentration camps become sites of mass execution.
256. See Rian Thum, China’s Mass Internment Camps Have No Clear End
in Sight, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 22, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/4FHC7Y47, for a Uyghur expert’s analysis of the State’s intent behind the rapid
expansion of the concentration camps.
257. Yasmeen Serhan, Saving Uighur Culture from Genocide, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/RA3W-WNQ7.
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imprisoned in the camps.258 There is no due process, and “[m]ost
people in the camps have never been charged with crimes and
have no legal avenues to challenge their detentions.”259 The
mass surveillance, deepened by the Strike Hard Campaign,
funneled droves of Uyghur into the camps by the day, where
control and discipline blurred with draconian forms of violence
believed to be arcane and extinct.260
Chinese surveillance also aims to break up the Uyghur
family—a form of mass violence spawned by surveillance.
Uyghur adults are arrested for the slightest “anti-extremism”
infractions, or no infraction at all.261 This often leads to
incarceration in the camps and the consequent funneling of
Uyghur children into Xinjiang’s string of brainwashing centers
disguised as orphanages or kindergartens.262 These centers are
where children are isolated from their parents, subjected to
Communist drills tailored for youth, and sometimes enlisted to
monitor their parents (and siblings) when reassigned to their
homes.263 The number of these “kindergartens” doubled in 2017,
in line with Quanguo’s expansion of the camps.264
The mosque, the institutional symbol of Muslim life, is
another site of mass violence spurred by state surveillance. To
further submit the Uyghur, Xi destroyed and razed tens of
258. Editorial Board, Opinion: China Is Creating Concentration Camps in
Xinjiang. Here’s How We Hold It Accountable, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2018),
https://perma.cc/6XQ9-JZ8T.
259. Maizland, supra note 7.
260. See Wang, supra note 17 (describing the “reports of deaths in the
political education camps, raising concerns about physical and psychological
abuse, as well as stress from poor conditions, overcrowding, and indefinite
confinement,” and “harsh punishments for disobedience in the facilities”).
261. See Chinese Counterterror Law of 2012, supra note 228 (provided in
§ I(3)–(4) of the law).
262. Isobel Yeung, They Came for Us at Night: Inside China’s Hidden Wars
on Uighurs, VICE (June 29, 2019, 10:54 AM), https://perma.cc/663L-5BU2.
263. See Sigal Samuel, China’s Jaw-Dropping Family Separation Policy,
ATLANTIC (Sep. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/9N9E-6RBU [hereinafter China’s
Family Separation Policy] (“China’s crackdown has some Uighurs in Xinjiang
worried that their own children will incriminate them, whether accidentally
or because teachers urge kids to spy on their parents.”).
264. See Nicole Bozorgmir & Isabel Yeung, Uighur Parents Say China Is
Ripping Their Children Away and Brainwashing Them, VICE (July 1, 2019,
11:56 AM), https://perma.cc/Q25L-6KJ5 (“[B]etween 2016 and 2017 the
number of kindergartens more than doubled to 1,265 from 481.”).
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mosques in Xinjiang.265 Many of these mosques were
longstanding shrines, destroyed to sever the Uyghur from vital
spaces of spiritual and civic congregation and erode the practice
of Islam among the Uyghur.266
The mosques that still stand have not been spared. Under
Quanguo, Xinjiang police have “installed video cameras over
mosque doorways to monitor worshippers” who frequent
individual mosques.267 Additional cameras were planted inside
mosques to monitor individuals who choose to maintain their
spiritual observance against standing policy.268
In addition to the mass discipline and punishment outlined
above, reports of women being sterilized to prevent Uyghur
births are widespread.269 Han men are incentivized by the State
to sleep with and marry Uyghur women.270 The harvesting of
Uyghur organs sold on global black markets further illustrates
the macabre nature of mass violence inflicted by Beijing on the
Uyghur.271
Chinese Studies scholar Joanne Smith Finley observes,
“[S]tate counter-terrorism becomes terrorism when it fails to
265. Thirty-one mosques and two major Muslim shrines were destroyed
between 2016 and 2018 in Xinjiang. Amy Gunia, China Destroyed Mosques
and Other Muslim Sites in Xinjiang, Report Says, TIME (May 7, 2019, 3:17
AM), https://perma.cc/Q6NC-EUGA. Of the thirty-one, fifteen were
“completely or almost completely razed.” Id.
266. Id.
267. See Topol, supra note 233. “Authorities have installed surveillance
cameras both inside and outside houses of worship to monitor and identify
attendees.” NARDI, supra note 127, at 1.
268. NARDI, supra note 127, at 2.
269. See China Forcing Birth Control on Uighurs to Suppress Population,
Report Says, BBC NEWS (June 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/42MS-D7ZS (finding
that Uyghur women were involuntarily fitted with IUDs, “coerced into
receiving sterilization surgery,” and “threatened with internment in camps for
refusing to abort pregnancies that exceed birth quotas”); Adrian Zenz, China’s
Own Documents Show Potentially Genocidal Sterilisation Plans in Xinjiang,
FOREIGN POL’Y (July 1, 2020, 10:38 AM), https://perma.cc/DH59-VSWW
(discussing China’s strategies to “suppress minority birth rates”).
270. See Xinjiang Authorities Push Uyghurs to Marry Han Chinese, RADIO
FREE ASIA (Sept. 2017), https://perma.cc/55X5-WVTD (“[The]Uyghur-Han
Marriage and Family Incentive Strategy . . . gave 10,000 yuan to Uyghurs and
Han Chinese couples who intermarried.”).
271. Will Martin, China Is Harvesting Thousands of Human Organs from
Its Uyghur Muslim Minority, UN Human-Rights Body Hears, BUS. INSIDER
(Sept. 25, 2019, 7:33 AM), https://perma.cc/SG5S-YZAR.
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distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, it is highly
disproportionate, and it aims to terrify or intimidate the wider
population or a particular community into submission.”272 The
State aim to subjugate and submit the Uyghur, which has
produced ghastly displays of mass discipline and punishment by
way of the global War on Terror and domestic policy, is further
accelerated by the digital architecture of surveillance
constructed in Xinjiang.
IV. DIGITAL ARCHITECTURES OF SURVEILLANCE
“With millions of cameras and billions of lines of code, China
is building a high-tech authoritarian future” designed to
subjugate the Uyghur in Xinjiang.273 This new architecture of
digital surveillance enables the State to track phone activity,
online purchases, social media engagement, personal networks,
and real time movement of the Uyghur in Xinjiang under the
banner
of
fighting
Islamic
terrorism.274
“Digital
Islamophobia”—the deployment of digital surveillance and Big
Data Policing to single out and subjugate the Uyghur on
grounds that their identity is presumptive of terrorism—forms
the architecture of digital surveillance in Xinjiang.275 This Part
first examines how digital surveillance drives the subjugation
society in Xinjiang, then turns to case studies that examine
China’s export of the digital architectures of surveillance it is
perfecting in the province.
A.

The Digital Panopticon

Section A will survey the chief components of the
subjugation society in Xinjiang, focusing on chief components of
the digital panopticon constructed in Xinjiang: (1) Smart City
272. Joanne Smith Finley, Securitization, Insecurity and Conflict in
Contemporary Xinjiang: Has PRC Counter-Terrorism Evolved into State
Terror?, 38 CENT. ASIAN SURV. 1, 15 (2019) (internal citations omitted).
273. Mozur, supra note 24.
274. See Chinese Counterterror Law of 2012, supra note 228 (provided in
§ I(3)(3) of the law); Dahlia Peterson, How China Harnesses Data Fusion to
Make Sense of Surveillance Data, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 23, 2021),
https://perma.cc/VRD5-R482.
275. This definition adapts the author’s formative definition of
Islamophobia. See Islamophobia, supra note 215, at 116.
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Policing; (2) Facial Recognition Software; and (3) Smartphone
Tracking.276 It closes with an examination of how these digital
surveillance tools function jointly to suppress collective Uyghur
identity expression and compel the minority group to comply in
their own subjugation.
1.

“Smart City” Policing

The logic behind the “smart city” is the urban planning of
cities around surveillance technology.277 The infrastructural
design of smart cities is tailored to facilitate data collection,
sensory tracking, and visual surveillance mechanisms
implemented by the State.278 Further, it is geared not only to
surveil everything that takes place within its bounds, but also
to serve the broader policing aims of the State by (1) collecting
data from its residents and visitors; (2) tracking their
movement; (3) limiting their movement with “digital
enclosures”; and (4) maintaining a fluid mine of data stored by
the state to progressively further its tracking capacity.279
Smart city design powers the new infrastructure of
surveillance in Xinjiang. With priority on the territory’s largest
cities, Kashgar and the capital, Urumqi, Xi’s focal aim is to
remake these urban spaces as the primary sites of total
surveillance.280 The first step was reconfiguring the surveillance
governance of cities and towns in line with Beijing’s total
surveillance mandate:

276. While other forms of Big Data Policing, which are mentioned in the
following sections, are employed in Xinjiang, this Article homes in on the
cornerstones of the architecture of digital surveillance in the province.
277. The “smart city” is the infrastructural replanning of cities around an
assemblage of technology that simultaneously monitors and mines data from
individuals within it. ANTHONY M. TOWNSEND, SMART CITIES: BIG DATA, CIVIC
HACKERS, AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW UTOPIA 273–76 (2013).
278. See Simon Marvin & Andrés Luque-Ayala, Urban Operating Systems:
Diagramming the City, 41 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RSCH. 84 (2017) for an analysis
of civil design of cities in line with surveillance and sensory technology.
279. Darren Byler, Essay, The Digital Enclosures of Turkic Muslims, SOC’Y
& SPACE (Dec. 7, 2020) [hereinafter Digital Enclosures], https://perma.cc/7YJZ2LMH.
280. See Josh Chen & Clément Bürge, Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How
China’s Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2017,
10:58 PM), https://perma.cc/5H8R-QV7U.
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Xinjiang
was
placed
under
a
grid-management
system, . . . in which cities and villages were split into
squares of about five hundred people. Each square has a
police station that closely monitors inhabitants by regularly
scanning their identification cards, taking their photographs
and fingerprints, and searching their cell phones.281

By integrating cutting-edge technologies into the urban
planning of Xinjiang, Beijing extended its capacity to surveil
Uyghur life and “violat[ed] religious freedom” far beyond
traditional limits.282
The smart city also enables the State to track the movement
of the Uyghur in Xinjiang. Those who travel from city to city
within the province are forced to carry a “convenience contact
card,” which includes the phone numbers of local police stations,
their landlords, family members, employers, and more.283 While
this policy covers all residents, it is disproportionately enforced
on Uyghur and ethnic Muslims. In 2018, Beijing introduced the
“smart card,” a digital update of the convenience contact card
that embedded a GPS locator with broader types of data.284 The
smart card communicates with surveillance technologies
planted in the smart city architecture, optimizing the State’s
ability to monitor the physical and virtual footprints of
everybody inside their digital enclosures.285
A.I. forms the nerve center of Xinjiang’s regime of digital
racial profiling. It coalesces the disparate streams of data mined
from smartphone tracking, facial recognition cameras, and
biometric and DNA information into neat codes to measure
“degrees of suspicion.”286 “According to experts, the Chinese
government’s use of artificial intelligence to track Uighurs and
Tibetans is the first known example of a government
intentionally using A.I. for racial profiling.”287 Currently,
Uyghur residents entering Xinjiang’s public spaces can be
281. Maizland, supra note 7.
282. NARDI, supra note 127, at 2.
283. Topol, supra note 233.
284. Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression, supra note 7, at 19.
“Identification cards are also needed to buy knives, gasoline, phones,
computers and even sugar.” Buckley & Mozur, supra note 169.
285. Digital Enclosures, supra note 279.
286. See Andersen, supra note 22.
287. NARDI, supra note 127, at 3.
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identified by matching (captured) images with an “ocean of
personal data” stored by the State.288 This matching is done in
rapid real time, and has accelerated the swelling arrest and
detention rates during the Strike Hard Campaign.289
After installation of the cameras, arrests in Xinjiang
proliferated to account for 21 percent of the nation’s aggregate
number of arrests in 2017.290 This marked a 731 percent
increase from the previous year, and is especially staggering
given that Xinjiang’s population (26 million) comprises only 1.8
percent of China’s total population (1.4 billion).291 These figures
illustrate how smart city profiling has enabled the efficient
detection of Uyghur travel through the province and instantly
accelerated arrest and detention rates.292
However, the deep machine learning capacity of Beijing’s
A.I.-powered surveillance has yet to reach its full potential.
Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, signed a
contract with Beijing in 2018 to help Xinjiang police analyze and
improve A.I. data.293 When a person passes through a
checkpoint and presents their smart card, police have access to
an endless supply of personal data.294 Data sets are designed,
with Huawei’s expertise, to identify individuals who
participated in a Quran discussion group on WeChat, purchased
an Arabic language book online, or engaged in a social media
exchange with somebody outside of the country295activity that
alone, and especially combined, could trigger state suspicion and

288. Andersen, supra note 22.
289. See China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Feb. 26, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://perma.cc/DTB2-MYK7.
290. Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in
2017, CHINESE HUM. RTS. DEFS. (July 25, 2018) [hereinafter Xinjiang’s Annual
Reports], https://perma.cc/G25T-6FT9 (citing TIANSHAN NET; Xinjiang People’s
Procuratorate Annual Work Reports (2014–2017); SUPREME PEOPLE’S
PROCURATORATE ANNUAL WORK REPORTS (2013–2017)).
291. Id.
292. The aggregate number of arrests in the Uyghur-heavy province was
27,404 in 2016, 35,568 in 2015, and 27,164 in 2014. Id.
293. Buckley & Mozur, supra note 169.
294. Andersen, supra note 22.
295. Id.
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feed the Uyghur into the “electronic surveillance pipeline” that
ends at the camps.296
2.

Facial Recognition Software

Technology that can distinguish the distinct phenotypic
characteristics of the Uyghur, and identify outward expressions
of Muslim identity such as the hijab or beards, is built into the
design of the primary surveillance tool used by the State.297
Powered by A.I., “[f]acial recognition technology has been
integrated into much of [the] surveillance network and trained
to identify” Uyghur facial characteristics.298 The technology has
been designed to home in on the Uyghur and other minority
groups that the Chinese government seeks to suppress.299 This
facial recognition profiling is not the outcome of policy or
decisions made by state agents manning checkpoints, but the
intended outcome of surveillance tools designed to single out the
Uyghur.300
China’s facial recognition technology is designed by Chinese
tech giants. The State collaborates with domestic companies,
including Hangzhou Hikvision, to plant facial recognition
cameras throughout the province.301 In 2019, Hangzhou
Hikvision installed cameras to monitor 967 mosques in one

296. I adopt the term coined by Arnett, who defines it in relation to
racialized policing in the United States as:
the various new technological surveillance strategies and devices
that comprise the surveillance regime of control primarily promoted
in community-correction models. Offenders enter the continuum
through risk assessment instruments and algorithmic formulas
that measure worthiness for surveillance, and then are exposed to
myriad community-based surveillance technologies that monitor
and manage offenders as a net-widened extension of incarceration.
From Decarceration, supra note 23, at 651 n.30.
297. Andersen, supra note 22.
298. NARDI, supra note 127, at 3.
299. Chinese tech companies have also filed patent applications for designs
that identify the Muslim minority. Avi Asher-Schapiro, Chinese Tech Patents
Tools that Can Detect, Track Uighurs, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. NEWS (Jan.
14, 2021, 5:50 PM), https://perma.cc/JSZ7-BBP9.
300. See Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using
A.I. to Profile a Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/8Y95QUXP.
301. See Buckley & Mozur, supra note 169.
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county in southern Xinjiang.302 This technology enables state
police to lock in on individual subjects entering or inside a
Xinjiang mosque and collect real-time images of activity that are
instantly fed into a central database.303 Further, this scope of
coverage in a single county in Xinjiang, which is divided into
sixty-one distinct counties, illustrates the vast scale of
surveillance.304
Facial recognition cameras are also stationed in cities and
at municipal checkpoints throughout Xinjiang. Similar to toll
stations on American highways, this network of checkpoints
serves as the digital walls that envelop the modern Chinese
municipality.305 The checkpoints also keep real-time tabs on the
movement of residents within their home cities:
When Uighurs reach the edge of their neighborhood, an
automated system takes note. The same system tracks them
as they move through smaller checkpoints, at banks, parks,
and schools. When they pump gas, the system can determine
whether they are the car’s owner. At the city’s perimeter,
they’re forced to exit their cars, so their face and ID card can
be scanned again.306

When Uyghurs travel beyond their hometowns, digital
checkpoints use “algorithms to predict the likelihood of
‘extremism’ in individuals and sort them for imprisonment,
indoctrination, or surveillance.”307 In Urumqi, Xinjiang’s

302. NARDI, supra note 127, at 3. In 2019, the Trump Administration
considered barring Hikvision from buying American technology. Buckley &
Mozur, supra note 169.
303. See Digital Enclosures, supra note 279.
304. See Xinjiang: Prefectural Divisions, CITY POPULATION (Feb. 20, 2022),
https://perma.cc/UB24-UNR4.
305. The system that connects this network of checkpoints is the
Integrated Joint Operations Platform (Ijop), “a regional data system that uses
AI to monitor the countless checkpoints in and around Xinjiang’s cities. Any
attempt to enter public institutions such as hospitals, banks, parks or
shopping centres, or to cross beyond the boundaries of . . . local police
precinct[s], would trigger the Ijop to alert police.” Darren Byler, China’s
Hi-Tech War on Its Muslim Minority, GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2019, 1:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/D3FK-9QR4.
306. Andersen, supra note 22.
307. James Millward & Dahlia Peterson, China’s System of Oppression in
Xinjiang: How It Developed and How to Curb It, BROOKINGS INST. 5 (Sept.
2020), https://perma.cc/QBV8-GPU3.
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capital, a staggering six million identifications were made at the
city’s 10,000 checkpoints in twenty-four hours’ time.308 The vast
majority of those identified and stopped were Uyghur, which
demonstrates the profiling efficacy of the technology.309 Chinese
tech titan Alibaba advertises that its products can “detect the
faces of Uighurs and other ethnic minorities within images and
videos.”310 These “Uyghur analytics” tools work alongside DNA
mining and matching at city checkpoints, where “Uighurs
frequently have their DNA collected and their eyes scanned.”311
In 2018, Beijing tasked Alibaba to create an A.I. facial
recognition software called “City Brain.”312 The project includes
technology that is “capable of detecting Uighurs by their ethnic
features.”313 Beyond facial recognition, this surveillance tool
enables the State to lock in on anonymous members of the
Uyghur population, distinguish them from Han and other ethnic
groups, and arrest members of the targeted Uyghur.314
Currently, the State has “face signatures,” which capture the
facial expressions of individuals from a series of strategic angles,
of the majority of Uyghur residents of Xinjiang.315
Fixed facial recognition cameras are accompanied by roving
surveillance technologies in Xinjiang. As of 2019, Chinese tech
companies “began making networked facial-recognition helmets
for police, with built-in infrared fever detectors, capable of
308. Buckley & Mozur, supra note 169.
309. “Under the pretext of ‘counter-terrorism,’ ‘anti-separatism,’ and
‘de-extremism’ efforts, Chinese authorities have greatly increased the number
of arrests and prosecutions in Xinjiang, which will have disproportionally
affected Uyghur Muslims. The government has abandoned any appearance of
maintaining judicial review or respecting due process rights in these ‘strike
hard’ campaigns.” Xinjiang’s Annual Reports, supra note 290.
310. Raymond Zhong, As China Tracked Muslims, Alibaba Showed
Customers How They Could, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://perma.cc/V4NP-6UBJ.
311. ALINA POLYAKOVA & CHRIS MESEROLE, EXPORTING DIGITAL
AUTHORITARIANISM: THE RUSSIAN AND CHINESE MODELS 5 (2019),
https://perma.cc/QRG5-86PU (PDF). Uyghurs stopped at checkpoints “may
[also] be forced to install spyware on their phones that tracks all of their online
activity.” Id.
312. Andersen, supra note 22.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Darren
Byler,
Ghost
World,
LOGIC
(May
1,
2019),
https://perma.cc/43D5-A6AL.
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sending data to the government” in real time.316 In 2018, police
and informants began to use facial recognition glasses.317 In
addition, “spy bird” drones equipped with video and facial
recognition cameras hovering above, disguised as doves, expand
the terrestrial space the State can surveil.318 While American
cities, like Baltimore, are still in the process of implementing
aerial surveillance to monitor Black spaces in the city, this
technology is firmly in place in Xinjiang.319
The smart city synchronizes facial recognition tracking
with other cogs of the surveillance architecture. Facial
recognition cameras communicate with the State’s collection of
Uyghur biometric and DNA data to identify, then match, a
subject with a stored profile.320 Xinjiang residents between the
ages of twelve and sixty-five must submit to medical
examinations that collect blood samples, eye and iris imaging,
voice recording, and fingerprints.321 This information is stored
by the State and continually updated with new data.322
Collaborating with Chinese tech companies, like iFlytek Co.,
Beijing continuously refines its aptitude to pair this biometric
data with terrestrial image capture and recording.323 The
placement of facial recognition cameras is a potent deterrent on
free movement and expression that also disciplines the Uyghur
from being and believing in line with their authentic selves.
3.

Smartphone Tracking

In this era of surveillance capitalism, the first item that
comes to mind when uttering the word “surveillance” is the
smartphone. In Xinjiang, the smartphone doubles as a “digital

316. Andersen, supra note 22.
317. Mozur, supra note 24.
318. Andersen, supra note 22.
319. See Race, Surveillance, Resistance, supra note 39, at 1108.
320. NARDI, supra note 127, at 3.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. iFlyTek Co. “specializes in speech and speaker recognition and
produces an estimated 70 percent of all speech-recognition technology in
China. . . . In advertising material, the company claims that its systems can
handle minority languages, including Tibetan and Uighur.” Id.
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Swiss Army knife” of monitoring and mining possibilities.324 In
a world where the smartphone has evolved into a bodily
appendage that accompanies the surveilled subject wherever
they go, it is the ideal digital surveillance tool.
Installation of malware into Uyghur smartphones is a
standard tracking practice. Hackers authorized by Beijing use
“phishing and fake app-stores” to distribute and seed the
malware, turning smartphones into nonstop tracking and
“listening devices.”325 In addition to monitoring vocal
communication, specific software is also designed to detect
Arabic script and written Uyghur.326 Smartphone tracking is
responsive, meaning that it aims to monitor the activity of the
target. However, extractive software, which mines data from
Uyghur smartphone users, is also embedded.327 This extractive
software intercepts data from the smartphones of Uyghur,
including photos, recorded communications, texts, browsing
history, and other items tied to Uyghur culture or Islam.328
Installation of “nanny apps,” software that monitors
smartphone use, is a growing practice in Xinjiang.329 These
“apps use algorithms to hunt for ‘ideological viruses’ day and
night,” homing in on Islamic practices.330 “They can scan chat
logs for Quran verses, and look for Arabic script in memes and
other image files.”331 This gives the State a penetrating, and
permanent, presence in the lines of communication,

324. Tim Bajarin, The Smartphone Is the Swiss Army Knife of Gadgets,
TIME (Nov. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/ZAL8-LQFV.
325. Sean Lyngaas, Chinese Mobile Surveillance of Uighurs More
Pervasive than Previously Thought, Researchers Say, CYBERSCOOP (July 1,
2020), https://perma.cc/ATW2-WT9P.
326. The World Staff & Carol Hills, How China Uses Malware to Track
Muslim Uyghurs, Even if They’ve Fled Their Country, WORLD (July 2, 2020),
[hereinafter Hills] https://perma.cc/5U49-RJ4T.
327. See Paul Mozur & Nicole Perlroth, China’s Software Stalked Uighurs
Earlier and More Widely, Researchers Learn, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/Y39P-Q2CB (last updated Jan. 19, 2021) (describing the
Chinese hacking campaign against Uyghurs).
328. See Hills, supra note 326 (“[H]ackers created tools disguised as
third-party apps to tap into phones in Xinjiang, which then allowed for the
ability to record and export information.”).
329. Andersen, supra note 22.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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entertainment, and everyday engagement conducted on the
smartphone.
For example, nanny apps track and store interactions on
WeChat, a central artery of communication, social media
engagement, and commerce in China.332 Abstaining from
platforms like WeChat is no simple task for the Uyghur, given
that it holds a “surveillance monopoly” in Xinjiang.333 The
platform is far more than a communication appit is China’s
most popular site for purchasing daily needs.334 Further,
WeChat’s vitality rose immensely during the coronavirus
pandemic, when Internet retail giants became the lone
platforms for purchasing groceries and other basic
necessities.335 This compelled the Uyghur to knowingly use a
platform that monitors and mines their data.
Beyond digital data, real-time conversations by phone are
also tracked and stored.336 The character of the person on the
other side of the line, in addition to the content of the
conversation, determines the scale of state suspicion. “Any kind
of contact from a non-Chinese phone number, though not
officially illegal, can result in arrest.”337 This is particularly true
if the caller is from a Muslim-majority state or a Uyghur caller
outside China.338
Uyghurs in Xinjiang are universally aware that their
smartphone activity is being surveilled.339 This knowledge, and
the stigma associated with it, has reshaped the Uyghur
relationship with the smartphone, disincentivizing routine use
of the smartphone and disciplining the Uyghur, en masse, to
engage with smartphones in line with the narrow confines
332. See Steven Millward, 7 Years of WeChat, TECHINASIA (Jan. 20, 2018),
https://perma.cc/VJ2Z-TVFX (providing a history of “China’s most essential
app”). The Chinese tech giant Tencent launched WeChat in 2011. Id.
333. See generally POLYAKOVA & MESEROLE, supra note 311.
334. See Rita Liao, WeChat Advances e-Commerce Goals with $250B in
Transactions, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 19, 2021, 10:23 AM), https://perma.cc/W39R9KDG (providing statistics and analysis of WeChat users’ shopping patterns).
335. Id.
336. Isobel Cockerell, Inside China’s Massive Surveillance Operation,
WIRED (May 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/4QJ8-LQW5.
337. Id.
338. Topol, supra note 233.
339. How Mass Surveillance Works in Xinjiang, China, HUM. RTS. WATCH
3–5 (May 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/7WS2-X5R5.
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imposed by the State. For instance, it is not uncommon for
family members to disconnect entirely from loved ones or cease
using the smartphone as a communicative device altogether.340
A Uyghur man currently living in Washington, D.C., shared,
I still have family in Xinjiang, and I desperately want to talk
to them. But I know if they get a call, a text or even a note
from me I can put them in danger. I am here [in the United
States], and that all by itself is reason for the [state] police
to take action against them. So, even though I want to more
than anything, I do not try to contact them to keep them
safe . . . . The phone [altogether] has become a sight of
worry.341

However, nonuse is no cure for smartphone surveillance.
Abstaining from phone use, and “irregular” phone use, can also
give rise to suspicion,342 converting the smartphone—technology
so deeply entrenched into Uyghur daily life—into the perfect
tool of subjugation society surveillance. This makes the
smartphone a tool of mass control and discipline that, as
illustrated by the violence wrought on the street and in the
camps, invites the violent hands of the State.
4.

Beyond Chilling

While scholars focus heavily on the chilling effect of digital
surveillance, the impact on the Uyghur in Xinjiang is far more
than chilling. The impact of digital surveillance transcends the
suppression of speech, assembly, and other core liberties
extended, albeit in a stratified way, in western control societies.
With no constitutional protections or civil liberties to speak of in
China, Xinjiang’s digital architectures of surveillance—by
design—have a mass subjugating effect that supersedes the
effect of marginalization, subordination, or, more technically,
the erosion of “substantive citizenship.”343 Again, it is critical to
340. See Topol, supra note 233, for a case involving a Uyghur mother who
intentionally ceased telephone communication with her daughter, living in
Sweden, for fear of state retribution.
341. Interview with Abdul N. (Oct. 14, 2020) (name changed to protect
anonymity).
342. Tanner Greer, 48 Ways to Get Sent to a Chinese Concentration Camp,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 13, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://perma.cc/57ZN-48F5.
343. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMA OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 31 (2006) (“[T]here is often a gap between
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remember that members of the polity in authoritarian states are
more subjects than citizens—a critical distinction with regard to
rights.344
The pervasiveness of targeted surveillance in Xinjiang
drives the Uyghur to underperform their cultural customs and
guise their bona fide identities. The regime’s digital
omnipresence pushes the Uyghur to elect out of religious
exercise, cultural expression, communal assembly, and travel.
This conditions “identity performance” in line with Beijing’s
Sinicization program among the Uyghur, and reperformance of
Uyghur identity in line with Han supremist benchmarks. In
turn, Uyghur “covering,” or full-fledged “concealment,” becomes
a mandate for survival in Xinjiang.345 The digital bounds of
surveillance condition the Uyghur to continuously moderate
their every action—off- and, especially, online.346
Examining the effect of subjugation through the prism of
identity performance, and distinguishing it from the
subordination that results in control societies, is instructive.347
Erving Goffman’s concept of “stigma” is lucidly demonstrated in
Xinjiang by the Uyghur response to digital surveillance.348 The
possession of [formal] citizenship status and the enjoyment or performance of
citizenship in substantive terms.”).
344. See generally Maximilian Koessler, “Subject,” “Citizen,” “National,”
and “Permanent Allegiance”, 56 YALE L.J. 58 (1946).
345. See Dan Levin, Uighurs’ Veils Signal Protest Against China’s
Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/YEL2-5PH3
(describing the experience of a Uyghur woman “torn between her professional
ambition and her outrage toward official restrictions targeting the Uighur way
of life”).
346. See Greer, supra note 342.
347. Identity performance involves the public negotiation of one’s
expression of self in line with incentives and disincentives. Behavioral
psychologist Erving Goffman developed this theory. See generally ERVING
GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1956). Identity
Performance theory has been influential among critical law scholars,
particularly those examining how subordinated identities—including gender,
sexual orientation, and race—stand as stigma that spur identity performance
in line with positive incentives. For a leading treatise on reperformance of
sexual identity, see Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
348. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED
IDENTITY
103–04
(1963)
(“[C]overing . . . is
an
important . . . ’assimilative technique[] employed by members of a minority
ethnic group[] . . . to restrict the way in which a known-about attribute
obtrudes itself into the center of attention . . . .”).
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state stigma ascribed to Uyghur and Muslim identity, so
ominous for the Uyghur, not only incentivizes them to “conceal
Islam” and their cultural practices, but also conditions them to
partake in the state project of removing associated practices and
traits through conditioned discipline and reperformance.349 In
turn, the Uyghur—as a population mass within Xinjiang—are
disciplined through the threat of arrest, detention, or worse to
reperform an identity that aligns with sanctioned Han custom
but is against the linguistic, cultural, and spiritual expression
central to Uyghur life.
This campaign of mass discipline, deepened by the State’s
penetrating gaze enabled by digital surveillance, is reactive and
productive. In addition to concealing native customs and Islamic
practice, Uyghur seeking to stave off punishment condition
themselves to speak Mandarin, express allegiance to the State
and the Communist Party, and take on Han cultural customs
and practices. The digital architecture of surveillance fixating
on the Uyghur has this potent two-way disciplining effect in
addition to mere control. Consequently, it blurs the lines
between control, discipline, and the corporal punishment
looming over Xinjiang.
This negating effect of digital surveillance in Xinjiang even
pierces spaces surveillance does not reach. As Paul Mozur of the
New York Times observed, “For technology to be effective, it
doesn’t always have to work.”350 Knowledge that the State has
exerted immense resources to surveil Uyghur life, alongside the
penetrating surveillance technology, is itself debilitating.
Echoing Foucault, the Uyghur subject becomes a “principle of
[her] own subjection” within Xinjiang, always believing she is
being watched even when she is not.351 The looming presence of
the smartphone, routinely seated near the subject and always
there, stands as an ever-present reminder that the State can see
what the subject is doing. It is more than the optimal digital tool
for controlled entertainment; in the subjugation society, it is an
ever-present embodiment of the State’s omnipresent gaze.

349. “‘Concealing Islam’ is the process whereby a Muslim American actor
trades in his or her Muslim identity for a non-Muslim identity within a specific
setting.” Acting Muslim, supra note 165, at 15.
350. See Mozur, supra note 24.
351. See FOUCAULT, supra note 22, at 203.
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B.

China’s Global Surveillance Footprint

The subjugation society is not confined to China. Nor is it
exclusively devised to subjugate and stamp out the Uyghur.
China’s expanding global influence, fueled in part by its digital
surveillance expertise, is pushing subjugation society
surveillance into new contexts.352 As Steven Feldstein observes
in The Rise of Digital Repression,
Chinese technology used for repressive purposes has
proliferated worldwide. Major Chinese firms, such as
Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, Dahua, Meiya Pico, Sensetime, and
others, are building safe city surveillance projects, peddling
high-tech censorship tools, and supplying advanced social
media monitoring capabilities to countries around the
world.353

Demand for Chinese companies’ digital surveillance tools is
especially high among authoritarian regimes with designs to
subjugate and stamp out their own oppositional groups. This
section examines two of these case studies: (1) the violent
crackdown on sexual minorities in Uganda; and (2) the
persecution of dissidents in Egypt.
1.

Uganda and Sexual Minorities

Uganda is trending toward a subjugation society. The
target in the African nation: sexual minorities. The State steers
its violent crackdown onto sexual minorities to deepen its
popularity. Serving as president of the African nation since
January of 1986, President Yoweri Museveni strengthened
352. China is unabashed about its global tech ambitions. President Xi is
positioning China to achieve global AI supremacy by 2030, surpassing the
United States as that market’s biggest player. This target, among other
economic aims tied to shoring up Chinese digital surveillance hegemony, is
integral to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a global infrastructure
development strategy devised in 2013 to invest in seventy nations and leading
international organizations. This initiative will build inroads to export
Chinese surveillance technologies, which will influence how surveillance is
administered in authoritarian and non-authoritarian states globally. See
Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://perma.cc/Y939-M66R (last updated Jan.
28, 2020, 7:00 AM).
353. STEVEN FELDSTEIN, THE RISE OF DIGITAL REPRESSION: HOW
TECHNOLOGY IS RESHAPING POWER, POLITICS, AND RESISTANCE 48 (2021).
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relations with China to modernize Uganda’s digital surveillance
state, deepening his stranglehold on power.354
Ushered into Uganda through the Digital Silk Road project
(DSR), China heads the assembly of a subjugation society in
Uganda. Huawei, the Chinese tech giant, is the on-site architect
of the African nation’s modern surveillance architecture355an
ambitious vision comprised of cutting-edge assemblage of
monitoring and mining tools that target Museveni’s political
opponents, chief of which are the nation’s persecuted LGBTQ
communities. This surveillance technology is poised to increase
homophobic dragnets and witch hunts, which play out violently
against sexual minority groups in Uganda.356
Powered by the smartphone tracking technology used in
Xinjiang, Ugandan police carry out mass arrests that blur the
lines between punishment and control.357 On November 17,
2019, Human Rights Watch reported, “[Ugandan] police [in
Kampala] carried out two mass arrests on spurious grounds,
abused the detainees, and forced at least 16 to undergo anal
examinations. Such examinations violate their right to bodily
integrity and freedom from torture and ill treatment.”358 These
sweeps are not uncommon in Uganda and are arbitrarily
commenced on the slimmest of suspicion.359 Often initiated on
no suspicion at all, they are staged to incite homophobic hysteria
that nets political points for Museveni and his regime.360

354. See Joe Parkinson et al., Huawei Technicians Helped African
Governments Spy on Political Opponents, WALL ST. J., https://perma.cc/EY27JBFJ (last updated Aug. 15, 2019, 3:21 AM) (“The deal with Huawei is a
survivor strategy to consolidate power. . . . It’s an all-out assault.” (internal
quotation omitted)).
355. See id. (“Technicians from [Huawei] have, in at least two cases,
personally helped African governments spy on their political opponents . . . .”).
356. Anti-homosexuality laws and surveillance have collaterally impacted
heterosexual communities as well, based on stereotypical and arbitrary
presumptions of homosexual identity performance. Uganda: Stop Police
Harassment of LGBT People, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 17, 2019, 9:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/WT8M-J4SM.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. For an account of homophobia and its popular and legal dimensions
in Uganda, see Lydia Boyd, What’s Driving Homophobia in Uganda,
CONVERSATION (Nov. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/VZ6K-PXF8.
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Like counterterror surveillance in Xinjiang, this punitive
policing has a sharp disciplining effect on sexual minorities in
Uganda. Digital surveillance chills and deters same-sex
relationships, pushes sexual minorities to “cover” their bona fide
sexual identity, and incentivizes them to reperform their
behavior in line with societal views of heterosexuality.361 In
some instances, these overpoliced communities undergo violent
conversion therapy—which renders lasting psychological and
physical harm on survivors.362 In sum, sexual minorities are
stripped of “human dignity” and subjugated by state-sponsored
homophobic zeal that blends discipline, control, and corporal
violence.363
With no viable threat to Museveni’s dictatorship, the
longstanding autocrat instrumentalizes state-sponsored
homophobia as an authoritarian tactic to raise his popularity
and deepen his authority. To further digitize this strategic and
structural commitment to homophobia, Museveni completed a
$126 million deal with China to introduce facial recognition
surveillance software.364 Modeled after the strategy in Xinjiang,
Huawei is building a system of interconnected CCTV cameras
through Ugandan cities, starting with the capital, Kampala,
that identify sexual minority activists and leaders, among other
“political opponent” groups.365 President Museveni himself
tweeted in celebration of the first installation of facial
recognition cameras at Kampala police headquarters on
November 28, 2019, updating the nation and his two million
followers about the Huawei project.366
361. See Yoshino, supra note 347, at 769.
362. See Khatondi Soita Wepukhulu, Anti-Gay ‘Therapy” Offered at
Uganda Health Centres Run by Aid-Funded Groups, OPENDEMOCRACY (June
30, 2021, 10:56 AM), https://perma.cc/HU33-9XMA.
363. Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on human dignity drove his opinion
upholding same-sex marriage rights on Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process grounds. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (“They
ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that
right.”).
364. See Elias Biryabarema, Uganda’s Cash-Strapped Cops Spend $126
Million on CCTV from Huawei, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2019, 4:48 AM),
https://perma.cc/54L2-CTZN.
365. Id.
366. Yoweri K. Museveni (@KagutaMuseveni), TWITTER (Nov. 28, 2019,
1:34 PM), https://perma.cc/7G4D-Q824.
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The installation of Chinese facial recognition surveillance
in Uganda will unfold in phases. “In the second phase, which
started rolling out [in early 2020], 20 facial recognition cameras
are expected to be installed and connected to 107 monitoring
centers at different police stations within 2,319 mapped
countryside municipalities and major towns.”367 This gives
Ugandan police deeper reach into LGBTQ political organizing
and private life. The state of surveillance is made possible by the
digital authoritarianism exported through the DSR, whereby
China is reengineering Uganda into the sort of submission
society it piloted in Xinjiang.368
2.

Egypt and Its Dissidents

The iconic images of Egyptian revolutionaries occupying
Cairo’s Tahrir Square live on. The faded pictures of an “Arab
Spring” testify to the possibility of democracy, crumbled by
another authoritarian regime that presides over the African
nation today.369 These images stir the fears of Abdel Fattah
el-Sisi, Egypt’s current autocrat, who rose to power on the back
of a military coup on July 3, 2013.370 In eight years, Sisi has
restored the authoritarian rule of the dictator (Hosny Mubarak)
whom Egypt’s historic revolution ousted in 2011, making Sisi a
“modern-day pharaoh” who, unlike fallen tyrants, is propped up
by sophisticated Chinese surveillance technology.371
Repressing the dissidents who unseated Mubarak is the
catalyst behind rising Egyptian-Sino relations. China and its
367. Huawei Infiltration in Uganda, PRIV. INT’L (June 25, 2020),
https://perma.cc/MBW5-WVJV.
368. See Jonathan E. Hillman & Maesea McCalpin, Watching Huawei’s
“Safe Cities”, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Nov. 2019),
https://perma.cc/85QF-RY6S (analyzing the introduction of seventy-three
“Safe City” agreements for surveillance products and services in fifty-two
countries).
369. The “Arab Spring” was the string of revolutions that began in 2010,
which included the Egyptian revolution of 2011. For a critical political history
of the Egyptian Revolution, see NEIL KETCHLEY, EGYPT IN A TIME OF
REVOLUTION: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND THE ARAB SPRING (2017).
370. For a succinct account of Sisi’s rise to power, see Dieter Bednarz &
Klaus Brinkbaumer, The Swift Rise of Egypt’s Sisi, SPIEGEL INT’L (Sept. 2,
2015, 12:26 PM), https://perma.cc/SJ98-MPSA.
371. See Elie Podah & Elad Giladi, With Sissi, Egypt Sees a Return of the
Pharaohs, HAARETZ (Aug. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/CHK7-YYK5.
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private tech giants are at the center of reconstructing an
Egyptian surveillance state that aborts the very possibility of
another popular revolution. To neutralize the milieu of identity
groups that spearheaded the 2011 Revolution, Sisi first directed
Chinese State Construction (CSC) to build a new national
capital thirty miles outside Cairo.372 The remote and tightly
guarded New Administrative Capital, which will cost Egypt $40
billion, will distance the state buildings from urban population
centers.373 It will thus prevent the popular mobilization and
protests that spurred the 2011 uprising. Municipal planning, as
highlighted in Xinjiang, is the first step toward making a new
state of surveillance. The massive “new capital” project has
opened the door for “more than 1,500 other Chinese firms [that]
are
currently
registered
in
Egypt,”
including
telecommunications, facial recognition, and surveillance
technology companies ready to wire the new capital and
surrounding areas with the most cutting-edge monitoring
machinery.374 With Chinese tech and expertise, Sisi is building
the “smart capital” for purposes of digitally deepening his rule,
identifying dissidents, and avoiding another popular revolution.
Sisi sees Islamic elements in Egypt as the principal threat
to his rule. Already backed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a
regional authoritarian power, Sisi has also forged relations with
China along kindred lines of mistrust toward Muslim
movements. While Egypt is a predominantly Muslim country,375
modern Egyptian autocrats have been deeply mistrustful of
Islamic political and grassroots movements,376 most notably, the
Muslim Brotherhood, which Sisi vowed to disband a year after

372. See Eric Olander, A New Chinese-Built Egyptian Capital Is Rising
Out of the Sand Near Cairo, CHINAFRICA PROJECT (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://perma.cc/B4AV-KHNE.
373. Mustafa Menshawy, Why Is Egypt Building a New Capital?, AL
JAZEERA (July 5, 2021), https://perma.cc/2LM9-2ZWU.
374. John Calabrese, Towering Ambitions: Egypt and China Building the
Future, MIDDLE E. INST. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/GL7D-2YJF.
375. The Egyptian population is 90 percent (Sunni) Muslim, and 10
percent Coptic Christian. U.S. DEP’T OF ST., EGYPT 2019 INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2019), https://perma.cc/E753-Z5B7 (PDF).
376. See Adam Lammon, Why the Muslim Middle East Supports China’s
Xinjiang Crackdown, NAT’L INT. (Oct. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/6AFQ-9PCL.
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claiming power.377 The Muslim Brotherhood are a longstanding
political movement rooted in Egypt, with deep ties throughout
the Muslim world, who leverage a Pan-Islamic political ethos to
mobilize grassroots support and build power.378
Sisi designated the Muslim Brotherhood, which briefly held
power in Egypt with the election of Mohamed Morsy as
president in 2011,379 as a terrorist organization in 2014.380 The
new head of state then pivoted to co-opt the centers and central
figures of Islamic authority in Egypt, most notably Al-Azhar
University, to cast out the Muslim Brotherhood on blurred
political and religious grounds.381 Shrouded by the endorsement
from the leading Islamic centers in Egypt and billion-dollar
surveillance projects with China, Sisi is shoring up his
authoritarian hold on power through state opposition to the
Muslim Brotherhood.
Sisi’s surveillance campaign against the Islamist group
mixes punitive violence with digital control. Even before the
development of Chinese surveillance and smart-city projects in
Egypt, the Sisi regime furiously cracked down on known and
perceived members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Human Rights
Watch, alongside Egyptian human rights partners, revealed,
The Interior Ministry’s regular police and its National
Security Agency have used widespread arbitrary arrests,
enforced disappearances, and torture against perceived
dissidents, many of them alleged members or sympathizers
of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Sisi’s primary political
opposition. The Egyptian Coordination for Rights and
Freedoms (ECRF), an independent human rights group, has
identified 30 people who died from torture while . . . [i]n
2016, the ECRF reported that its lawyers received 830
377. See Egypt’s Sisi Vows Muslim Brotherhood ‘Will Not Exist’, BBC
NEWS (May 6, 2014), https://perma.cc/4XM9-CPKR.
378. See CARRIE ROSEFSKY WICKHAM, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD:
EVOLUTION OF AN ISLAMIST MOVEMENT (2015), for a modern political history of
the group and movement.
379. See Ashraf El-Sharif, The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Failures,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (July 1, 2014), https://perma.cc/7P38JVTM.
380. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist
Group?, N.Y. TIMES (April 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/DMH9-XSJL.
381. See Khalil Al-Anani, All the Dictator’s Sheikhs, FOREIGN POL’Y (July
20, 2020), https://perma.cc/49LM-6RR4.
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torture complaints, and that another 14 people had died from
torture in custody.382

Egypt’s commitment to digitizing its surveillance state, powered
by Chinese know-how and tech, centers on subjugating the
Muslim Brotherhood in particular and Egyptians suspected of
being sympathetic to the movement and its ideas more
broadly.383
This suspicion, enforced selectively by the Sisi police state,
deters members of society from speaking freely on political
matters, attending specific mosques, and wearing a beard or
hijab—among other forms of benign expression the State
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.384 After all, Muslims
are the first and familiar target for these Chinese surveillance
technologies, which were engineered to track the Uyghur in
Xinjiang.
C.

Beyond Subjugation, Subordination and Control

During the inaugural Race, Law, and Technology
Convening on November 11, 2022, Chaz Arnett asked, “Is it
possible to conceive of the United States becoming a subjugation
society?”385 This was not the first time this query was posed,
particularly given the volatile surveillance moment that this
Article was born into. Arnett’s question, focusing on how digital
surveillance and policing tools have been deployed in
overpoliced communities of color in the United States,
highlights the salience of subjugation society theorya salience
that, with the rapid expansion of Chinese digital surveillance
products and the aggregate advancement of these tools, signals
382. HUM. RTS. WATCH, “WE DO UNREASONABLE THINGS HERE”: TORTURE
NATIONAL SECURITY IN AL-SISI’S EGYPT 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/3M6AMH8K (PDF).
383. See Barbara Zollner, Surviving Repression: How Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood Has Carried On, MALCOLM H. KERR CARNEGIE MIDDLE E. CTR.
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/B97B-ZF8B.
384. “Soldiers on the street stop and ask me sometimes, ‘are you in the
Akhwan?’ (the Arabic name for the Muslim Brotherhood) . . . or if my friends
are part of it. . . . I think they stop me because I wear hijab.” Interview with
Sawsan H. (Apr. 3, 2020) (name changed to protect subject’s anonymity).
385. Professor Chaz Arnett, Remarks at Race, Law, and Technology
Convening (Nov. 11–12, 2021). The convening was held virtually over Zoom
and organized by Jessica Eaglin, Chaz Arnett, and Margaret Hu.
AND
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the deepening of, at minimum, subjugation society tactics on the
domestic front.
This Article crystallizes how the administration of
surveillance is materially shaped by political context and the
identity of the surveilled. Thinking about the United States as
a democratic control society, where democratic safeguards and
the singular objective of control unravel in overpoliced
communities of color, reveals liminal sites of surveillance. These
liminal sites, between the orders of control and subjugation, are
where the ensemble of violence, discipline, and control are
jointly administered against Black people in the name of
criminal policing, against immigrant Muslim communities in
furtherance of the War on Terror, or against urban enclaves
populated with Latinx communities to regulate immigration
through the heavy presence of Immigration Customs and
Enforcement (ICE).386
Per Arnett’s question, what distinguishes these heavily
policed American geographies—and the communities that pull
these surveillance technologies in—from the subjugation
societies described above? What laws, or lack thereof, stifle
foreign and domestic vendors of surveillance from equipping
American law enforcement with the digital tools to reach deeper
into the lives of targeted communities, which are often followed
by the punitive violence inflicted on city streets or in prisons?
This Article may not provide clear answers to these
questions. But it provides a theory that unveils how erased
subjects of surveillance shine light on liminal sites of
surveillance previously unseen and, thus, undeveloped.
Currently, the (thinning) constitutional protections in even the
most overpoliced spaces in the United States, where mass
subordination has not yet devolved into the subjugation we see
in Xinjiang, stands as the principal distinction between these
more ominous sites of the American control society and the
subjugation society.
Perhaps the subjugation society framework, which makes
sense of surveillance targeting subaltern groups beyond the
confines of race, will inspire additional theorizing that develops
distinct, liminal, or additional surveillance societies. Or,

386. See Barton Gellman & Sam Adler-Bell, The Disparate Impact of
Surveillance, CENTURY FOUND. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/G2GK-G9QV.
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perhaps, the digital surveillance technologies of tomorrow,
developed in American labs or exported from Beijing, will
dissolve the lines that currently stand between the two.
Theory is, after all, a technology. For it to make sense of the
law and the world it creates, theory should emulate the
dynamism and constant forward momentum of the digital
surveillance tools described within and beyond the four corners
of these pages. If it fails to do so, it falls short of seeing
everything and everyone for what they areparticularly in the
darkest corners where the most vulnerable dwell.
CONCLUSION
At night she kept looking at her son’s picture and
crying.
Since the guards could see this on the camera,
They yelled at her over the speaker,
“If you look at your son’s picture and cry again,
We will take it away.”
Darren Byler387
“Does technology favor tyranny?” probed a Foreign Affairs
headline, atop a portrait of a Chinese policeman scrutinizing the
smart ID card of a young Uyghur man in Kashgar. 388 This
question grapples with Lawrence Lessig’s view that
technologies “do not naturally . . . tend” toward tyranny, or
democracy for that matter.389 While pressing, the more
important question for overpoliced and subaltern groups may
be: how does surveillance technology reshape the spaces of society
that I call home? These intimate spaces, which were once
isolated from the gaze of the State, today dissolve the need for
hardened bars and the theoretical bounds that separate
surveillance society orders.
The development and mainstreaming of digital surveillance
have led legal scholars to grapple directly with this latter
question. By doing so, a burgeoning literature investigating the
racialized administration of digital surveillance, and its deeply
387. IN THE CAMPS, supra note 4, at 31.
388. Does Technology Favor Tyranny?, FOREIGN AFFS. (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://perma.cc/R5VU-YWPK.
389. Lessig, supra note 131, at 220.
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racial effects, challenges colorblind theorizing that presumes
that policing technologies, in and of themselves, are inherently
neutral. This scholarship, centering the American experiences,
swells during a time when “recent advances in surveillance
technology are increasing the power of police, at the same exact
time that avenues for regulating police misconduct and
overreach are becoming weaker.”390
Trenchant in their analysis and timely in their critique,
critical scholars have revealed how Big Data Policing is
mounting police power while leaving marginalized communities
more vulnerable to police overreach. This Article joins the
scholarly movement that proclaims, emphatically, that the
tyrannical capacity of policing technology rests largely on the
identity of its target and the political geography where it is
being administered. By looking beyond race and the western
control society, the society of subjugation reveals how digital
surveillance is wielded against subaltern groups that
authoritarian governments are bent on persecuting. This
objective supersedes the aim of control, synchronizing
surveillance that facilitates mass discipline with punishment as
tentacles of that campaign.
Prevailing surveillance theory draws rigid lines that are
traced along white and western contours. In turn, it overlooks
the rich color between and at the margins where subaltern
groups experience surveillance at sites where punishment,
discipline, and control converge frequently and furiously.
Subjugation society theory centers these erased experiences and
overlooked sites, creating a new frame where digital
surveillance draws lines on the very top of communities marked
as oppositional on account of how they look; where they worship;
what sexuality they identify as; and why they continue to clench,
desperately, onto cultural traditions. It is here, “beyond the
walls of intelligence, [where] life is defined,”391 and where the
existence of subaltern bodies is closely surveilled and
theoretically erased.

390.
391.

Race, Surveillance, Resistance, supra note 39, at 1105.
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